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SUMMARY
The project investigated the uses of artificial intelligence and robotic technologies as 
media. 
It asked: Why make mechanical intelligence? What are the rhetorics and discourses of 
mechanical intelligence? How can we deploy machine intelligence as media? 
To answer those questions the project works through issues such as how is intelligence 
defined? What are the differences, if any, between human and machine intelligence? How 
does the creation of machine intelligence challenge humanist notions, which have 
traditionally set the human species apart from all other species created in nature? How 
does a conversational agent cause problems for our notions of intelligence and agency?  
How does a mechanical automaton affect notions of life?  
The project surveyed mathematics, informatics, statistical analysis and their histories, and 
the history of human engagement with machines, and used technologies as a palette from 
which to construct artifacts that illustrate how people engage with machines. 
The project is a humanist project concerned with amongst other issues, the sentient and 
not sentient binaries offered in discourses on machine intelligence. 
One of the conclusions of the project is that the discourses that delineate the field of 
mechanical intelligence spring from the same sources as those discourses and rhetoric 
that delineate human beings from all other things.
The work is segmented into five distinct areas of practice that inform the design and 
implementation of artifacts using machine intelligence (Jones:1999). These are interaction 
with human beings, the world, other processes, and with knowledge deployment. Each 
area was examined in an iterative process in terms of theoretical issues, a prototype that 
addressed an artistic idea arising from the issues and a proof of idea demonstrating 
functionality and reliability
The methodology produced a number of works with mechanically intelligent components, 
each illustrating a particular research emphasis and informing answers to each of the 
research questions. An animated 3D conversation agent that grew beyond simple 
conversation, an automated visual field, a robotic youRobot and a number of essential 
animations of six-legged walking machines, together with an exegesis that relates to 
theorizations of human and machine intelligence and behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION
Sentience: the human and not human
Art and technology, the organic and artificial, create troubled juxtapositions1. There is a 
photograph taken from the Apollo 11 spacecraft in 1969 of Earth-rise over Smuth’s Sea on 
the Moon’s surface. Earth hangs like a watery jewel over an empty lunar sea. It is an 
image that exposed the pinnacle of humanist endeavours in engineering and science that 
enabled the human species to traverse time and space, whilst simultaneously being 
emblematic of human fragility displayed aptly by broadcasts from the Apollo II of excerpts 
from Biblical accounts of Genesis. An analogy is set up here between human origins and 
advancement that enabled us to conquer space travel, whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging the search for the meaning of our insignificance in the vast cosmic 
landscape. 
Art, political structures, spiritual centres and space flight are artifacts which celebrate the 
simultaneous pleasures and perils of human sentience. The photograph of earth rising 
over Smuth’s dead sea is a memento mori equivalent in its significance in modern culture 
to the Sistine chapel and Michelangelo’s depictions of sentient beings, which flood the 
ceiling.
Sentience is a term most likely to be encountered in discourse as one of the binary 
opposites deployed in humanist projects to delineate the human from not human (animals 
and machines). Sentience is more likely to be described in terms of what is not sentient 
than what it explicitly is. The political, philosophical, religious, medical and literary 
vocabularies used to describe the experience of sentience are, as Elaine Scarry observes 
in The Body In Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985), often insufficient to 
express individual embodied experience. Where language fails, the responsibility to depict 
the intensities and flows of embodied experience often falls to artists. In this vein my PhD 
project became bound up with my own lived experience, both in the technologies deployed 
and the questions raised in their deployment.
In the late 1990s my nervous system failed, leaving me struggling to walk, grasp and see 
in any coordinated fashion. Hospitalization and surgery and a long recovery followed 
where I learned to walk again and control the palsy that rendered me unable to draw with 
any clarity of line. 
Previously I had worked with German artist Michael Saup to realize his acoustic 
installation Paula Chimes (1991). The work was interactive in that it sensed movement and 
responded, in part, by physically striking metal tubes of varying length against each other 
to create bell-like sounds. Suap’s work is not explicitly technological. He uses technology, 
as many artists do, as an unobtrusive means in the creative process. 
My work takes a contrasting approach where technologies themselves comprise the 
palette. It does not seek to simply mimic the technologies it uses as outlined in Stephen 
Wilson’s manifesto on technology and art, where 
artists learn as much as they can about working with the technologies so that they can function as 
knowledgeable commentators. In one typical strategy, artists become technically proficient so they can 
produce works that look legitimately part of the output of that technological world while introducing discordant 
subversive elements that reflect upon technology (Wilson, 1995).
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1 I am reminded of David Hockney’s painting ‘Marriage of Two Styles’, with its subjects sitting uneasily 
together.
My work instead attempts to deploy the technologies to make visible some aspects of 
embodied experience and work through some theoretical problems arising from the 
experience of embodiment. 
Computer-assisted works constructed, such as the Interactive Jesus series during the 
1990s, attempted dialectic between knowledge and belief. The dialectic in this work was 
concerned with sentient embodiment, that is, the existential experience humans have as 
intelligent autonomous beings. The dialectic arises in part from humans characterizing 
their experiences as intensely physical on the one hand and indescribably personal on the 
other. The experience of embodied sentience is so personal that nobody can prove that 
the experience exists. We can only assume that, after Rene Descartes, Je pense donc je 
suis (I think therefore I am). 
In The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985), Elaine Scarry 
attempts to unpack personal experience by characterizing bodily pain as a particularly 
sentient problem that cannot be communicated without an objectifying referent. She writes 
that humans build whole civilizations to at once communicate sentient pain and attempt to 
heal their bodies of it. The objects a civilization constructs reflect the human desire to 
express sentience, where they can offer no personal proof of it, and are themselves 
civilizing objects made to reciprocate a desire to be more sentient.
After the tradition of humanism, this present body of work is concerned amongst other 
things with the sentient/not sentient binaries deployed to affirm the unique status of 
humans.
Abandonment of narrative convention: problems of interactivity and electronic arts
I have lost confidence in all descriptions of computer-assisted art as interactive and have 
abandoned formulations of the systematic compilation of pictures and sound over time as 
narratives. Each frame of a time-based sequence theoretically depends upon each other 
frame occurring in an expected place, so that a person casting a passing glance at a 
movie screen would never be expected to grasp the narrative as a whole. Yet a brief 
glimpse is all beauty needs to greatly move a human heart.
In On Beauty and Being Just (1999) Elaine Scarry discusses Homer’s account of 
shipwrecked Odysseus’ encounter with Nausica. Odysseus says of Nausica I have never 
laid eyes on anyone like you. 
Homer recreates the structure of a perception that occurs whenever one sees something beautiful; it is as 
though one has suddenly been washed up onto a merciful beach: all unease, aggression, indifference, 
suddenly drop back behind one, like a surf that has for a moment lost its capacity to harm (Scarry, 1999: 25).
A similar insight of my own led me to abandon all theories of narrative convention. Time 
based narrative became the enemy of beauty and anathema to art. I restructured my entire 
body of work into fragmented layered animations thrown at a screen like the methodology 
of an action painter; the animations themselves displaying neither beginning nor end, only 
an infinite loop.
My works, realized on large screen video projections, produced an experience that favored 
temporary form, flow, intensity, fragmentation and discontinuity, intensified with rhythmic 
sound and colour fields. The work was entirely computer-assisted without any film or video 
loops.
8
Mark Rothko’s colour field paintings of the 1950s and 1960s are meditations on 
transcendent experiences of sentient embodiment. He painted many for internal spaces 
that reflected the longing individuals feel to express themselves as spiritual beings. By 
definition, spirit cannot be objectified, but the colour fields of Rothko are thought to 
exemplify human experiences of spirituality.
Abstract Expressionism, Color Field and Kinetic art, for instance Stephen Willat’s Visual 
Field Automatic (1964), were early contributions to the comprehension of computer-
assisted works. My animations have reflected these influences and were created and 
layered with rapid movements of hands over monitors; colour field properties determined 
by a hybrid analog and digital video processor and the whole resampled and re-
synthesized by an array of effects generators. 
I was drawn, possibly because of my history in film and television, toward the school of 
audiovisual production that espoused the nonlinear narrative. This computer-assisted time-
based form of storytelling was based upon preoccupations with choice and theories of 
narrative developed in the study of cinema. An individual engages with a nonlinear 
narrative by choosing a pathway through a story that is expected to be experientially 
different from other defined pathways in the narrative. Such narratives were theorized as 
nonlinear because the story branched at certain points, based upon choices exercised by 
the citizen-consumer operating a narrative machine. Most theory in the field seemed to 
originate with discussions of hypertext.
I participated in one or two group exhibitions that explored conceptualizations of computer-
assisted interactive and nonlinear narrative, with my work on a tiny cathode-ray screen 
dutifully clicked through by audiences using mouse-like devices pointing at screen-based 
icons. It was the first time in my life I had engineered one part of a picture as an icon and 
not another.  Formerly I had ascribed iconic possibilities to the whole.
The engagement with such narratives became known as interactive, a term encompassing 
both the work and the experience of it. I found these attempts at new media clumsy and 
dull and, with the emphasis on consumer choice, more political than artistic.
Moreover, the interactive narratives were often constructed from that most formulaic of 
stories, the hero mono-myth, which after the success of the movie Star Wars, was thought 
extremely bankable.
Around that time my nervous system became dysfunctional and I had great difficulty 
grasping, seeing and walking. In the 1990s I began to experiment with remote sensing in 
large installations based upon themes from Judeo-Christian history. I became interested 
again in dialectics of knowledge and a belief that I felt was illustrated in colour field and 
abstract expressionist painting. Interactive Jesus was an installation work realized as an 
animated stained glass window that sensed acts of prayer and responded with angels and 
a series of animated color fields. 
Another artwork, The Biometric Shepherd, recognized people acting out the passion of 
Christ, and responding with an animated apotheosis. These works can be imagined as 
robots since the devices produced a set of predictable outputs in response to stimuli. 
However, I was less interested in robots and more concerned with theoretical descriptions 
of images as machines. 
In the works I made in the later 1990s I attempted a dialectic between image machines 
and human experience through references to belief and to what I imagined as the 
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antihuman dogma of cybernetics. The Biometric Shepherd in particular theorizes 
teleological (as well as biometric) profiling as a dogmatic, rather than information process.
It seemed to me that there is room in human experience for mystery that cybernetic 
theorizing finds inconvenient. Teleological descriptions of human experience reduce men 
and women to economic units, for instance the hunter-gatherer, the salary man and the 
housewife are all conceptualizations of the functionality of men and women in capitalist 
economies. 
Elaine Scarry describes capitalism as a narrative where  
men and women stand in the presence of an economic system collectively made to relieve them of the 
problems of sentience. (1985:276)
Problems of sentience are characterized by Scarry as the human body in pain, and its 
attendant human project to relieve bodies of pain by building civilizations. Scarry 
characterizes Christian dogma as simultaneously the healing staff and wounding sword of 
God made collaboratively by men and women to relieve them of the problems of 
sentience.
I felt that a personal dialogue was emerging in my work and the issues I explored 
illustrated desire-producing reality as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari had suggested in 
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1983). I sensed that the dialectic 
between knowledge and belief in the work somehow reflected the inner tension between 
the effects of my damaged nervous system and the memory of and desire for normal 
sensation.
In 1998 I began to collaborate with the preeminent international performance artist Stelarc, 
on his Walking Machine project for the City of Hamburg, Germany. The project required 
the expertise of a virtual reality modeller, a job I could manage quite easily from my studio 
in Melbourne, Australia. I was increasingly unable to walk, grasp, or reason coherently. 
Microsurgery at the end of 1998 relieved my spinal cord of the burden of tiny shards of 
embedded bone. My recovery from that surgery was spent on crutches somewhat similar 
to the simulated legs that I had made for the Walking Machine or Exoskeleton. In 1999 I 
produced a series of illustrations, VR models and animations of the Movatar/Avatar - a 
wearable robot used by Stelarc in performance.
The Movatar/Avatar illustrated ideas from Scarry who wrote that it is the responsibility 
(object responsibility) of made objects to reciprocate, somehow, the desire that led to their 
imagining (1985).
I found that working with robotics suited my psychological response to the spasticity in my 
own limbs. The predictability with which the robots moved relieved me somewhat of the 
existential problems I faced as my own nervous system was physically and chemically 
reprogrammed. Simultaneously, memories of limbs in motion became my own desiring 
machine, sometimes producing predictable motion in my own limbs as I progressed, 
toward walking again. The mechanical qualities of the robot’s limbs, as I worked them, 
mirrored a longing for predictability in the movements of my own body.
The Movatar/Avatar design unfolded alongside the awareness that I was losing the use of 
my limbs. It engaged with my interest in boundaries between sentient and not sentient 
states of being. Since my earlier explorations of knowledge and belief felt unfinished, this 
was another way to interrogate dogma. I was intensely aware that these boundaries were 
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salient in my own life, because parts of my body defied sentient control and became part 
of medical discourse. I also became painfully aware of the wide range of sentient 
experience and its often narrow and sometimes contradictory interpretations.
In cybernetics all sentient activities are assumed to proceed toward a rational goal-state. 
A number of questions were raised for me, such as: How is sentience and non-sentience 
defined? Can sentience and non sentience exist simultaneously? Is non-sentience a 
discontinuity or simply a matter of dogma? If so, is it specified with reference to physical or 
metaphysical origins? Does the spasticity in my own limbs reflect some non-sentient 
existence that coexists in my body, or am I experiencing the binary opposites of mind and 
body existentially, where previously I had sought only to investigate those opposites in my 
imagination? I decided that the field of robotics provided a fertile discourse from which to 
unpack these questions.
Langdon Winner wrote that recognizing change is a gift that should not be ignored (1986). 
What if, as I had proposed in Interactive Jesus, informatics technologies were the third 
attempt by our culture to relieve the human body of the problem of sentience? The first 
was the adoption of Judeo-Christianity and emphasized lack; the second was the adoption 
of capitalism and the scientific method, which emphasizes excess. Was informatics the 
next wave?  If so, what did that mean?
Miracles and markets are socio-cultural mechanisms that relieve of the problem of 
sentience. Although computer-assisted technologies seemed at once miraculous and sale-
able the miracles and markets that enveloped them addressed no sentient problem that I 
comprehended. It seemed to me that those technologies introduced an element of 
resignation and despair into artistic practice exemplified in the works of www. 
sentientart.com. Sentientart proposed an installation where an artificial intelligence would 
simulate a holocaust victim.
Finally my legs could no longer support my body. My arms were extended with two 
prosthetic walking sticks when I stood, so that in part I obliquely resembled the walking 
machine that I had pre-visualized for Stelarc. My work at Sussex University produced the 
bio-robot design (afterward called Hexapod) and simulation in 2001 and marks the 
continuation of a long collaboration with Stelarc that persists today. The work through MIT 
produced some small autonomous robots and the prototype and design for the youRobot 
in 2002, the first finished gallery-quality piece of my PhD project.
Julie Clarke wrote of this work:
In a kind of Baudrillardian nightmare all traces of flesh have been devoured. It mocks our own unseen and 
unnoticed internal bodily functions as pure automata. If we resist the notion that there is a body behind the 
texts, or that some spirit controls the function of the machine, then we are left with the question: What can be 
said to be evidence of mind?’ Surely we must conclude that there be other criteria located not in the machine 
in its familiar uncanny mimesis, but in our lived bodily experiences (Clarke, 2002).
My PhD project evolved during 2000 and 2001 to its present international scope, with 
emphasis on the body and technology. It is, despite all odds, a humanist project concerned 
with amongst other issues, the sentient and not sentient binaries offered in discourses on 
machine intelligence. The discourses that delineate the field of mechanical intelligence 
spring from the same sources as those discourses and rhetoric that delineate human 
beings from all other things.
The dissertation will expound upon, illustrate and explain the issues that arose during the 
research. These are: What are the discourses and rhetoric surrounding and constituting 
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mechanical intelligence? Why make mechanical intelligence? How can mechanical 
intelligence be implemented in interactive media? 
I worked through the questions by allowing both theory and practice to inform every stage 
of the investigative process. The work is segmented into five distinct areas of practice that 
inform the design and implementation of artifacts using machine intelligence (Jones:1999). 
These are interaction with human beings, the world, other processes, and with knowledge 
deployment. Each area was examined in an iterative process in terms of theoretical 
issues, a prototype that addressed an artistic idea arising from the issues and a proof of 
idea demonstrating functionality and reliability
The methodology resulted in the production of a number of media artifacts with 
mechanically intelligent components, each illustrating a particular research emphasis and 
informing answers to each of the research questions, that is, an animated 3D conversation 
agent that grew beyond simple conversation, an automated visual field, a robotic 
youRobot and a number of essential animations of Stelarc’s six-legged walking machines, 
together with an exegesis of texts that relate to the theorization of human and machine 
intelligence and behaviour. Those questions are: Why make mechanical intelligence? 
What are the rhetorics and discourses of mechanical intelligence? How can we deploy 
machine intelligence as media? Whilst undertaking the research a number of other 
questions came to the fore, such as: How is intelligence defined, what are the differences, 
if any, between human and machine intelligence? How does the creation of machine 
intelligence challenge humanist notions, which have traditionally set the human species 
apart from all other species created in nature? How does a conversational agent make 
problematic our existing notions of intelligence and agency?  How does an automaton 
make problematic the notion of life?  My methodology was twofold.  Whilst undertaking 
animations and the constructions of robotic constructions to demonstrate ideas, I was also 
reading theorists from within cultural studies, cognitive science, computer technology, 
musicology and the humanities. The theory often leaked into the production of the artifacts. 
Outline of Chapters 
In chapter one: Rhetorical themes surrounding machine intelligence I undertake a trace of 
the rhetoric employed to address ancient machines that spoke, as well as new rhetoric that 
surrounds computer-generated conversational agents. Some of this rhetoric addresses 
human versus machine intelligence, including consciousness and awareness; concepts of 
living and not living entities theorized through mathematical systems and the theory of 
Vitalism. The unseen, unconscious, but quantifiable, as opposed to the empirical, and 
notions surrounding the inorganic versus the organic. 
In chapter two: Situated Intelligence and the Walking Head project I describe the 
collaborative process between myself, Stelarc and F18 in Germany to produce a simulated 
prosthetic head displayed on a video monitor mounted on a walking robot. I enter into a 
discussion around human, animal, insect and machine embodiment and drawing upon a 
number of theorists who have engaged with notions of machine intelligence.
Chapter three: Gnu Not New develops ideas from a paper that I presented at a 
conference, which was ultimately published.  In this chapter I challenge the notion that 
new media, including the construction of conversational agents is in fact new.
In chapter four: The Walking Head I focus primarily on Rodney Brooks’ theory of situated 
intelligence that is dependent upon machine learning from its environment. I enter into a 
discussion that surrounds intelligence related to behaviour, particularly in relation to intent 
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or purposeful action and the way in which the Walking Head makes problematic the 
boundaries between the human and the not human and sentient and non-sentient 
behaviour. 
In chapter five: The Six Legged Walking Machine I describe various design projects that I 
have been involved in with Stelarc, namely the six legged walking robots - Hexapod and 
Muscle Machine. I situate the machines as artifact and trope of humanity’s dependence 
upon technology as prosthesis and enter into a discussion about evolution, this allows me 
to expand upon and challenge ideas presented in chapter one.
In chapter six: The youRobot I describe the robots functioning and draw upon notions of 
embodiment described by theorists and refer to a number of science fictions films in order 
to tease out the similarities and differences between the youRobot and robots depicted in 
film. I signify the importance of poetry in negotiations between the human and the 
machine.
In chapter seven: Methods I describe the methods used to investigate the research 
questions and how those investigations led to the creation of the Vocalizing Avatar and the 
Visual Field Automata installations.
In sum, this dissertation attempts to trace the rhetoric that surrounds the human and the 
not human. It is concerned amongst other things with sentient/not sentient binaries 
deployed to affirm the unique status of humans. In particular, it addresses aesthetic, 
technical and philosophical questions that surround the human condition.
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CHAPTER 1: RHETORICAL THEMES SURROUNDING 
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE AND CONVERSATIONAL 
AGENTS
This chapter investigates discourses, which surround historical as well as contemporary 
mechanical constructs that speak, as well as the theoretical concerns and rhetorical 
themes surrounding the Vocalizing Avatar project.
Conversational Agents 
Recent developments in computer technologies, which use 3D animation, electronic voice 
synthesis and speech recognition algorithms enable the construction of conversational 
agents. A conversational agent is a computer program that responds to plain language 
inquiry, rather than a mnemonic, Boolean operation, or similar highly structured Meta-
discourse. 
3D callback engineering using electronic voice synthesis and mathematical algorithms 
from the discipline of computational linguistics provide mechanisms to animate and 
characterize the agent as it responds to human communication, usually by way of typed 
text entered at a computer terminal. As each part of the utterance is generated it is 
evaluated by software that converts the sound into appropriate contours on the agent’s 
features, which are then displayed as a projection with sound. Conversational agents are 
remarkably simple to engineer yet are capable of complex symbolic interactions with 
users. Imagined as agents for human beings, these partial onscreen personalities have 
the capacity to engage in simple conversation with humans and virtual agents and as such 
may be perceived as displaying a form of intelligence. 
Discourses
Important to my theoretical and practical investigation of conversational agents are 
discourses that emerge about these mechanisms, and attempts by some theorists to 
justify those discourses by appealing to authorities of specification in the natural and social 
sciences. A persistent theme that circulates around machine constructs suggests the 
possibility of consciousness. At least two separate theories exist that describe 
consciousness - machine consciousness and human consciousness. However, in both 
accounts consciousness is perceived as mechanistic. Machine consciousness is theorized 
as simultaneously different from and similar to human consciousness. Human 
consciousness is conceptualized as continuing from biological processes that are 
complex, but essentially mechanistic and deterministic. The information sciences have 
adopted a set of theoretical mathematics with which to understand nature as an evolution 
machine, aligning those academic disciplines engaged in the production of mechanical 
intelligence (Brooks and Flynn, 1989) (Breazeal, 2004) with the efforts of the natural and 
social sciences to understand the physical world by empirical methods. 
I argue in this chapter that conceptualizations of the mechanical as natural, do not stem 
from any new discovery about the nature of human consciousness but are linked with and 
depend upon ideas about human nature that have remained contentious since ancient 
times. I also challenge the notion of new media as relying heavily on ideas from the past in 
my chapter entitled Gnu Not New in this dissertation. 
The made and the born
Distinctions between the made and the born, an idea put forward by Kevin Kelly in Out of 
Control: The New Biology of Machines, to explain the logic of Bios being imported into 
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machines, and the logic of Technos being imported into life (1994:2) provide a contrast 
with traditional humanist notions that tend to reinforce binary oppositions between humans 
and machines and accentuate human dominance over nature. 
I contend that such confusions of the natural with the mechanical form a discursive field 
upon which the collision of metaphysics and materialisms can be acted out. Such acting 
out by machines provides the capacity to add a performance element to installation art. 
Performative in this context engages with Judith Butler’s theory of gender performity in that 
gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist 
the deed (Butler, 1990). This idea resonates strongly with one put forth by Friedrich 
Nietzsche who said that ‘there is no being behind doing, effecting, becoming; the doer is 
merely a fiction added to the deed - the deed is everything’ (Nietzsche, 1969:45). This is a 
potent idea when considering mechanical intelligence.
My interest in conversational agents sprang from an idea that an artwork that engages in 
spoken discourse draws attention to an otherwise private but complex dialogue that arises 
from the experience of art. Discourse involves listening, and while it is not uncommon to 
read that an artwork spoke to someone, that is, the artwork touched some aspect of them, 
the experience of speaking and listening is comprehended as a private, often emotional, 
human characteristic. An artwork that engages in conversation must also listen, bringing 
elements of theatre and performance to an installation. In so doing, the artwork, and in this 
case the conversational agent, assumes the attitude of a listener, a position formerly 
imagined as being an exclusively human one. While this is a purely symbolic shift in 
perspective it is expressive enough to raise questions about the human experience of 
consciousness, and of self and other.
There is, in discussions of artificial life and mechanized intelligence, a sense of the surreal 
as natural, rather than uncanny and artificial objects remain undifferentiated, one from 
another. Surrealism, which was perceived, as a strangeness of composition or relation, is 
an interesting way to describe the blurring that occurs between the organic and the 
artificial in accounts of mechanical intelligence. 
Binary oppositions, such as categorizations of objects as living and non-living things, are 
unified in a discourse appealing, to a large extent, to the empirical methods of the natural 
sciences. 
Rhetorical themes surrounding machine intelligence suggests the possibility of machine 
consciousness, as simultaneously similar to, but different from human consciousness. In 
Artificial Life: the quest for a new creation Steven Levy draws upon the work of Jon von 
Neumann, Norbert Wiener, George B. Dyson and John Kenny to propose that machines 
might be able, following mathematically described natural laws, to evolve in a similar way 
as biological creatures. Levy (1992) cites Conway’s Game of Life “Glider” that evolves 
from mathematical rules applied to cellular automata, as proof of cellular automata or 
mechanical life. In particular, he argues that the Glider phenomenon occurs naturally 
because it can be studied as if it were a natural phenomenon.
Evolution
Levy argues that nature is an evolution machine, where biological and mechanical 
systems are theorized according to a common property - a capacity to replicate. This is 
essentially understood as an encoded set of instructions, now popularized as the genetic 
algorithm (Dyson, 1997). Levy fails to note that comparisons of coded instructions for a 
computer to DNA are rhetorical, not real, and can be traced to ancient ideas that life has 
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an essential underlying property that distinguishes living from not living things. His thesis is 
an argument contrary to metaphysics that stems from Charles Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection, which contests those old ideas with a non-metaphysical account of natural 
complexity arising from natural selection.
Accounts of nature that do not include or acknowledge metaphysics remain hotly 
contested. Such discourses, whatever their positions, draw attention to the experience of 
life because much of the polemic involves questions such as: How did life begin? How are 
humans different from all other living things? My idea for using artificial intelligence stems 
in part from the desire to engage with discourses about our essential nature and to 
simultaneously challenge these ideas.
Von Neumann investigated mathematical descriptions of natural complexity and 
maintained that life depends upon a measure of complexity. Once a level of complexity is 
reached, nature produces objects that are more complex than the parent. In von 
Neumann’s mathematical model, simple organisms could evolve into more complex ones. 
This theory mirrored Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution that maintained that the human 
species evolved from a single-celled organism (Levy, 1992:30). Von Neumann’s model 
offered mathematical confirmation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory. 
Michel Foucault notes in the Archaeology of Knowledge:
In the eighteenth century, the evolutionist idea is defined on the basis of a kinship of species forming a 
continuum laid down at the outset (interrupted only by natural catastrophes) or gradually built up by the 
passing of time. In the nineteenth century the evolutionist theme concerns not so much the constitution of a 
continuous table of species, as the description of discontinuous groups and the analysis of the modes of 
interaction between an organism whose elements are interdependent and an environment that provides its 
real conditions of life. (1989:40)
In the twentieth century the evolutionist theme extended beyond the study of organism to 
encompass artifacts and abstractions, in particular the economy and the Internet, thus 
conceptually blurring the boundaries between living and nonliving things.
George Dyson, in Darwin Among the Machines: the evolution of global intelligence claims 
that, ‘…we have created a digital wilderness whose evolution may embody a collective 
wisdom greater than our own’ (1997:228).
Dyson argues that information technologies, particularly the internet, provide ecologies for 
electronic organisms that evolve and grow in ways similar to but simultaneously different 
from natural ecologies 
by conveying information across distance and over time, or from one form of expression to another hosting 
the reproduction of structures (letters, words, enzymes, ideas, books or cultures) (1997:225).
The idea that human nature, or mind, can evolve over time has particular significance in 
explanations of human social behaviour, and special relevance to ways that people are 
observed to interact with computer technologies. Reeves and Nass conducted a series of 
experiments that showed people unconsciously treat computers as they might treat other 
people; politely, compassionately and with a sense of community, leading them to theorize 
that the human brain is hardwired to interact with others socially because it
evolved in a world in which only humans exhibited rich social behaviours, and in a world in which all 
perceived objects were real physical objects. Anything that seemed to be a real person or place was real 
(Reeves & Nass, 1996:12)
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Mathematics
Alongside astronomy and anatomy, mathematics has long been regarded as one of the 
natural sciences. Mathematics allowed descriptions of natural phenomena as formula, and 
during the twentieth century mathematical formula became popular in philosophy to 
illustrate the workings of logical thought. The use of mathematics, particularly geometric 
formulas to describe the human body, has a long tradition and is demonstrated and 
exemplified in drawings produced by Leonardo Da Vinci. Applying similar mathematical 
formulas to descriptions of the workings of the mind, Rene Descartes, tried and failed to 
offer proof of mind and coined the aphorism I think, therefore I am.
Vitalism
Other ideas that distinguished between living and non-living things through the concept of 
Vitalism were put forth by Julian Offrey de La Mettre, who kept alive the idea of essence 
proposed by Aristotle and Plato, who conceived these differences as the result of the 
essential nature of those things. La Mettre (1996) held that essence was contained in all 
parts of all living things, and practiced animal vivisection to uncover that essence. Ideas 
about vitalism were closely aligned with metaphysics and descriptions of essence as spirit 
or soul in that they relied upon unseen forces acting upon the human body. (Berkeley:
1910). These forces were seen to be precursors of consciousness.
These ideas hypothesize unseen forces, such as a vital essence, acting upon living things 
to differentiate them from nonliving things. Mathematicians have sought to describe the 
unseen since ancient times using symbolic logic. In von Nuemann’s work the symbolic 
collides with and sometimes subsumes, with its earnest descriptions, observations and 
representations of nature, so that mathematicians assume the mantle of naturalists in a 
digital wilderness. In Man a Machine (1996), La Mettre imagines that mechanisms 
powered by essence will produce minds free from the imperfections of nature that lead to 
war, disease and death while retaining, despite their mechanical origins, the essential 
nature of humanity.
Informatics
Information science characterizes information in natural terms. It is a discourse that refers 
to data trees, cyber spaces, viruses in the wild and other descriptions de-contextualized 
from their original meaning but nevertheless compelling in their references to natural 
ecosystems. However, the largest single link between the natural and information sciences 
is the idea of information entropy, that is, the notion that informatics systems become more 
complex over time. All natural phenomena become more complex over time in a process 
called entropy. Ripples on water are a familiar example. The decomposition of a living 
body after death is another. Dyson (1997) proffers that proof of informatics entropy is the 
complexities and redundancies of data and its connections on the worldwide web as it 
grows over time. Conceptualizations of entropy are normally associated with physics and 
the second law of thermodynamics, but are here subsumed into a discourse on symbols. I 
have noted elsewhere that such emphasis upon informatics entropy, upon an endless, 
replication of fragments of information is more illustrative of human experiences of 
fragmentation and dislocation common in the twentieth century than of any natural 
coupling of information and thermodynamic energies (Middleton, 2005).
Statistical analysis
Sigmund Freud theorized that the human mind was divisible, and provided taxonomy of its 
parts and partial descriptions of their operations. While Freud’s taxonomy and 
observations remain contentious they have gained a great deal of authority as empirical 
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methods, notably statistical analysis, provided confirmation of Freud’s theory of the 
divisibility of mind (Freud, 1975).
It is important here to remember that statistical analysis is significant in the information 
sciences because of its emphasis on aggregations of massive amounts of information 
analyzed according to a predetermined mathematical formula. Statistical analysis is used 
extensively in the medical sciences, notably in epidemiology, and also forms the basis of 
computer profiling, used in data processing for a large range of purposes including 
computer dating, social-security fraud and the biometric profiling of terrorist suspects. 
Statistical analysis has its roots in the theory of large numbers (Boole, 1854, Bayes, 1764, 
Sinclair, 1799) and has been criticized by many theorists, notably Michel Foucault (1972), 
not so much for the veracity of its methodologies but for their politicization and misuse. 
Statistical analysis was used in eugenics - a social policy instigated by Francis Galton 
(Charles Darwin’s cousin), by using biometrics to support the notion of genetic 
determinism, and to prove that some races were superior (Dyson, 1997). Foucault (1972) 
also criticized the statistical method for its focus on similarity, where difference is often 
profiled as a potential crime.
Margaret Mead, describing the discourse of cybernetics, spoke of the end of dependence 
on script (writing) for knowledge (1968:1). She maintained that systems analysis, informed 
by statistical analysis, using a symbolic discourse of feedback and reinforcement, would 
replace ordinary language. “Dress has succeeded the mimeographing machine as a form 
of communication amongst the dissenting young” (1968:1-2). Anticipating globalization, 
she theorized cybernetic communications as having the capacity to provide “the linkages 
necessary amongst large industrial complexes that are widely separated in 
space” (1968:5).
Descriptions of knowledge as programming can be traced to behavioural psychology. 
Those differ from Aristotle’s concept of essence by studying behaviour as evolving from 
positive or negative reinforcement. The intellectual descendants of von Neumann, namely, 
Wiener and Laing are therefore able to treat mind as a mathematical system. Freud 
showed that mind was a complex and evolving system, because it can be formulated as 
moving from simple to complex states over time (Breazeal, 2004). 
Complex machines?
One of the rhetorical themes in the discourse of mechanical intelligence is the idea that a 
machine is more likely to be mistaken for a person if it becomes more complex than its 
makers intended. Alan Turing was the first to formalize ideas about the complexity of 
machines in Can Machines Think? (1950). Turing identifies nine contrary arguments in his 
paper, categorized as theological, social, mathematical, ontological, engineering, 
philosophical, medical, behavioural and psychic. He argues that if a machine is capable of 
having a sufficiently complex conversation with a human being, enough to convince them 
that they are speaking to another human, then, in all fairness we must describe the 
machine as thinking. However, the antithetical arguments Turing discusses illustrate not 
only the complexity of his question, they draw attention to the complexities of the human 
mind as well, and how effectively the Turing machine might be able to simulate those 
complex activities, particularly communication. The components of a computer system 
can, as Turing proposed, be arranged to simulate conversation. In systems analysis, 
particularly cybernetic systems analysis, no distinction is made between organic and metal 
components, only between successful and failed communications.
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The argument from complexity can be traced to Von Neumann and his work with evolving 
systems. Von Neumann’s insight, that life depends upon complexity to evolve, fits perfectly 
with evolutionary theories. He speculated if one can make a mechanical system complex 
enough then one can simply sit back and watch it evolve.  If a human activity, such as 
communication, was formulated in a simulation that evolved from a simple state to a more 
complex one over time, then following Von Neumann’s logic the mechanical could be 
conceptually synchronized with the biological. 
Effect
Norbert Wiener (1967) conceptualized communications according to their effect. This 
teleological view of communications systematically privileges successful communications, 
irrespective of their origins. Teleology is a doctrine that explains phenomena according to 
its purpose and affect. A machine that communicates effectively has the same weight in a 
cybernetic analysis as an effective human communicator. Turing’s test relies upon human 
fallibility, whereas in a cybernetic system any failure is excluded by the systematic 
reformulation of connections to it.
In several papers Rodney Brooks attempted to decouple ideas of intelligence from formal 
descriptions of reasoning processes by proposing a behavioural model that he referred to 
as situated intelligence. Brooks (1991) defines intelligence as the ability to affect the 
environment that the intelligence is situated in. It is a pragmatic definition of intelligence 
that Brooks specifically announces as a distinct rupture in the discourse of artificial 
intelligence.
The following is an example of situated intelligence: A machine controls a fan and a heater. 
Its goal state is to keep the situated environment of the fan and heater at a constant 
temperature. A simple computer program monitors a thermometer in the environment, and 
operates the fan when the temperature increases, and switches to the heater when the 
temperature cools. The thermometer is an enabling technology that allows the computer 
program to gauge whether the heater or the fan should be operating. This model of 
machine intelligence is informed by the percept-leads-to-concept explanation of human 
thought, where the percept is invoked as a result of processing stimulus from a sensory 
organ.  A mechanical sensor is conceptualized as an eye, ear or nose, with the percept 
provided from a database and a concept that is, turn off fan, turn on heater formed from 
the interaction of a database and a preprogrammed sequence of machine instructions, 
encoded in anticipation of the event. In this example the system recognizes an imperative 
and acts accordingly. In Brooks’ definition a mechanical system like this is intelligent 
because it affects the environment it operates in. 
Von Neumann, Turing, Wiener and Brooks offer persuasive rhetoric in their arguments for 
mechanical intelligence. The argument that a simple system can evolve to a complex one 
situates their rhetoric in mainstream science with its appeal to evolution and the 
philosophies of Darwinian determinism. The components of a mechanical mind can be 
arranged to imitate the component parts of the human mind identified by Freud. In 
cybernetic systems analysis, no distinction is made between organic and metal 
components; distinction is only made between successful and failed communications. 
Psychological behaviourism leads to the conclusion that, if a behaviour appears intelligent, 
then it must spring from intelligent intent. Purposive systems - those complex systems that 
show a capacity to evolve into more complex ones like von Neumann’s  cellular automata, 
Conway’s  Gliders and Brook’s  Atilla, Kismet and Cog - are theorized, with these rhetorics, 
as intelligent (Levy, 1992) (Dyson, 1997).
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Jean Baudrillard argues that such systems offer only the spectacle of thought and in 
manipulating them people devote themselves more to the spectacle of thought than of 
thought itself (1993:53). 
Julie Clarke observed:
The need to rationalize the differences between virtual and organic beings reveals the level of anxiety 
produced when we are faced with a non-human other who is presented as more human than human (Clarke, 
2002:3).
In some literary accounts automatic processes and their affect upon human experience 
have been made problematic. In William Shakespeare’s play Hamlet, the mechanical 
determinism of vendetta causes a crisis of existence for the protagonist Hamlet when it 
conflicts with his ideas of free will. Being human is proffered as a struggle between 
mindless determinism and individual thought. Human thought leads to human values 
(G.W. F. Hegel, 1996) and these values are often contrasted, in popular culture, against 
presumed mechanistic, deterministic, non-human values. According to Majorie Kibby, the 
rise of thinking machines  
...proliferated an established theme that pitted human values against the presumed non-values of technology 
and mechanization (1996:1). 
This situation creates uncanniness between the human and the machine through the 
notion of evil or unease.
Constructed Language
Hamlet wonders whether Satan sends the apparition that he sees. In Robert Green's 
prose comedy Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay (1594) set in thirteenth-century Oxford, 
Franciscan Friars Roger Bacon and Thomas Bungay make a brass head. With the help of 
Mephistopheles, the brass head speaks, although its prose is ambiguous.  The idea of a 
human being physically attracted to a machine has been dramatized in Ernst Hoffman’s 
short story Der Sandman (1817), and in the ballet Coppelia (1870), where the object of 
desire is a dancing doll. Fritz Lang’s film Metropolis deals with the vamp in the machine 
(Huyssen:1981/82). Barbara Creed (1993) characterized such texts as portrayals of 
women dehumanized and rendered dangerous by their association with a machine.  Freud 
(1997) characterized machines that appear to have human purpose uncanny.
However, these contemporary accounts of automata may be traced to legends of 
machines that spoke that are described in writings of the ancient world (either statuary 
busts or mummified skulls) and were reputed to utter prophecies, perhaps via hidden tube 
or ventriloquism, or to nod or shake their heads when questioned, presumably being 
secretly operated.
Both the head of the Jackal God and the bust of Re-Harmakhis in the Valley of the Kings 
have hidden tubes leading to their mouths.
Ancient histories mention naturally occurring non-human vocalizations such as the Colossi 
of Memnon - a pair of 18-meter high statues at Thebes that were already ancient when an 
earthquake damaged one in such a way that made it sing at particular times. The sound 
continued and became the subject of much curiosity during Roman times, until 
stonemasons repaired it two centuries later. 
In modern times synthetic communications have a rich history. The international auxiliary 
language Esperanto was invented by a Polish eye-specialist, Dr. Lazarus Ludovic 
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Zamenhof, and first appeared in 1887. He wanted a neutral language to bring together the 
Russian, Polish, German and Jewish sections of the area he lived in, because the mutual 
hatred between these peoples was increased by the lack of a common means of 
communication. At first his language went by the name Lingvo Internacia de la Doktoro 
Esperanto, but this was soon shortened to just Esperanto, a word in the language itself 
meaning ‘one who hopes’. 
Jean Francois Sudre (1787-1864) developed Solresol in 1817 and interest continued past 
his death (courtesy of posthumous publication) to 1866. Solresol is important to the history 
of constructed languages (particularly inter-languages) on several grounds: it was the first 
artificial language to extend beyond the project stage and to be taken seriously as an inter-
language. It is the first and only musically based inter-language.
The first modern attempt to produce voice rather than music from a musical instrument 
was by Kratzenstein. In 1773 he demonstrated a set of air-blown resonators capable of 
forming a range of vowel sounds. This was followed very closely in 1791 by Baron 
Wolfgang Von Kempelen, a Hungarian inventor at the Austrian court who demonstrated 
equipment capable of rudimentary speech synthesis that consisted of a bellows to produce 
a through draught, reeds and resonating chambers to produce phonation, and wood, 
leather, and ivory articulators to produce the sounds. In 1823, Maelzel had patented a doll 
that could say Mama and Papa. By 1844, Faber was demonstrating a euphonia capable of 
synthesizing all the sounds of all the European languages (Lindsay, 1997). A century later 
Homer Dudley, of Bell Telephone Laboratories, used radio valves to create the voice of 
VODER, the world's first electronic speech synthesizer, demonstrated at the New York 
Worlds Fair of 1939.
Conversational agents
Contemporary computer technologies implement 3D modelling and animation, electronic 
voice synthesis and speech recognition algorithms, including text to speech translators to 
animate virtual characters that are responsive to human communication. Conceptualized 
as agents for human beings, these partial onscreen personalities have the capacity to 
engage in simple conversation with humans and with other agents. These are cybernetic 
agents in every sense of the word because their effectiveness is measured as directly 
proportional to the success of any communication they make.
Joseph Wiesenbaum, the software engineer who created Eliza the first successful 
conversational agent, stated,  
Never has computer software needed more explanation than this. (Wiesenbaum, 1966)
He thought that it wasn’t an effective demonstration of intelligence. This series of intelligent 
agents differed from their predecessors by being completely automatic. All Eliza required 
was an input of language in sentence form to communicate. However, these 
conversational agents create both a delight and anxiety in the human who interacts with 
them, as well as providing occasion for questions regarding the human condition in 
relation to machines. Clarke observed about Stelarc’s Prosthetic Head, a 3D animated, 
conversational agent:
Although the Prosthetic Head (Stelarc's version of the conversational agent) may represent the posthuman 
condition, that is, the human body that has been extended enhanced and extruded by technology it also 
maintains the humanist notion that the prosthesis/technology is a discrete entity from the human, thus 
upholding established binaries (2005:4).
Clarke takes a view, in part contrary to Donna Haraway, who laments that  
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Our machines are so lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert (1991:152). 
Clarke’s view is that the liveliness displayed by these constructs serves only to accentuate 
the vitality and heroism of human life, a humanist view evident since Michelangelo 
decorated the Sistine chapel with figures of man creating figures in his own likeness 
(Clarke, 2002).
The mechanistic non-values of technology paradoxically serve to promote human 
uniqueness and superiority in these devices. While on the one hand von Neumann and his 
disciples offer mathematical proof that all life is mechanistic and deterministic, the 
technologies that their theorization produce, serve, as Baudrillard (1983) observed, only to 
parody human thought and intent. While cybernetics offers methods that render machine 
and human communication indistinguishable, the communications themselves rely wholly 
upon input from human beings (Wiesenbaum, 1966), further privileging human experience. 
The most common complaint about conversational agents is that their conversations 
quickly become gibberish to human users. Wallace (2001) and others have made 
improvements to Wiesenbaum’s algorithm during the past forty years, allowing the 
implementation of algorithms that, as Turing had speculated, allowed human observers to 
mistake communications by a machine for communication from a human being. However, 
as Clarke (2005) wryly observes, such mechanical devices lack pathos, that particularly 
human expression of the agony of consciousness.
Ultimately, the technologies fail to persuade that they are alive. Those technologies do, 
however, provide a field of discourse upon which to debate what it means to be human. In 
that respect, the technologies only serve as the antithesis that proves the proposition that 
humans are unique in the world. The Vocalizing Avatar and Prosthetic Head make 
problematic such propositions.
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CHAPTER 2: SITUATED INTELLIGENCE 
Having cited specific historical precedents of automata and rhetoric deployed to describe 
these entities in Chapter One, in this chapter I will focus primarily on a contemporary, 
highly developed and complex manifestation, which speaks as well as moves and interacts 
with its environment. This robotic Walking Head, discussed in Chapter Four, unlike 
incarnations from the previous two centuries, which created a feeling of the uncanny, 
unease or delight in the viewer, pose a challenge to our notion of the human, in regard to 
intelligence, traditionally associated with human movement, agency, sensory apparatus 
and embodiment. Following from Brooks’ argument that intelligence is situational, that is, 
an agent can be seen to be intelligent by its reactions to its environment; in this chapter I 
will explore various discussions that surround instinct, intelligence, purposeful action and 
the relationship between language and intelligence. 
This section of the project specifically refers to a collaborative process between myself, the 
performance artist Stelarc, and F18 the Hamburg based experimental technology 
collective. The project involves a six-legged walking robot powered by compressed air and 
a 3D rendering of a human head displayed on a seventeen-inch flat panel LCD screen 
mounted on its body. This robot performs and vocalizes in the presence of a gallery 
audience. My contributions to this collaboration are the partial personality software libraries 
developed in another section of this project, a 3D model of the head (in the walking head) 
and its synthesized vocalizations.
This project endeavours to explore the contributions that theories of intelligence, derived 
from observations of nonhuman creatures make to discourses surrounding practice. 
My interest in this part of the project is to work through ideas about machine intelligence, 
behaviour, and the human/not human elements rendered simultaneously in the robots 
actions and vocalizations.
Instinct or Intelligence?
Ideas about what constitutes intelligence are central to the discourses that surround 
investigations of machine intelligence. However, the notion of situated intelligence, which 
challenges conventional ideas about human intelligence and uniqueness, is an important 
idea that informs much of the work in the overall project.
Formal studies of human intelligence were often expressed as a metric, intelligence 
quotient (IQ), which was derived from a written test. The IQ test provides a methodology 
with which to perceive relative intelligence between individuals and populations, but it 
offers no explanation as to why individuals or populations are intelligent. 
The absence of a single and definitive model of human intelligence raises doubts about 
projects that attempt to artificially replicate human intelligence. Perhaps in deference to the 
lack of strong empirical models, intelligence tends to be discussed in terms of behaviours 
and their outcomes, in relation to the nonhuman (machine) and in terms of what 
intelligence is not, rather than what it is.
In order to investigate the problematic between the notion of intelligence and instinctual 
behaviour, part of my project was to study the tripod gait exhibited in invertebrate 
movement and to reproduce that gait in the walking machines. The gait is engineered in 
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the limbs of the walking head, which keeps two legs on one side of its body and one on 
the other side of its body firmly on the floor, whilst its other three legs are repositioned 
midair for the next stride. The gait is named after the tripod-like positioning of the three 
legs.
The functions of walking invertebrates are analyzed in much the same way as motion is 
described in chemistry. A stimulus is thought to cause actions in some parts, then more 
actions in parts secondary to the original, then more actions in their associated parts, and 
so on until the whole reaches equilibrium and requires another stimulus to set it in motion 
again.
Movements in the limbs of invertebrates are derived from the autonomous nervous system 
that is, they are executed without preconception, and are interpreted to be one of a 
number of autonomic reflexes that combine in invertebrates and other creatures. These 
autonomic reflexes are theorized as instinctual.
Instinct is understood to direct behaviour, but not in the same way as intelligence, although 
there is no theorized conception of where the boundary between instinct ends and 
intelligence begins. If a behaviour is instinctive, that is, not preceded by thought, an action 
resulting from such behaviour does not carry the same responsibility. Human behaviours 
are not always intelligently directed. For example, the concept of mens rea or thought 
preceding action is not taken for granted in legal and medical discourse. However, humans 
are generally thought to intelligently direct their behaviour in contrast to other creatures, 
whose behaviours are considered instinctual.
According to the discourse of cybernetics, intelligent behaviours are purposive. (Brooks:
1991). Interpretations of behaviours as purposeful are based upon the analysis of 
behaviours against preconceived goals. Those working within the field of cybernetics make 
no distinction between behaviours that are intelligible and behaviours that are intelligent, 
and offer no accounts of the metrics of lesser or greater intelligences.  Goal directed, or 
purposeful behaviours are assumed to be intelligent as a first principle from which all 
theories of organized behaviours continue.
Although instinct and intelligence are not readily separable, humans are thought to be the 
only living creatures that reason. Reasoning is often described with a classification 
process that attempts to organize the sensory field according to previously classified 
concepts. Where a sensory input cannot be classified a reasoning process is engaged that 
attempts a new classification based upon previous experiences. 
Mechanical models of reasoning processes require the robots to be equipped with a set of 
stored data complete enough to allow a substantial part of their environment to be 
classified; and processors and algorithms fast enough to process those representations. 
Early attempts to build autonomous robots following representational models of 
intelligence were not successful.
Situated Intelligence
In a series of papers at the end of the twentieth century Rodney Brooks attempted to 
decouple ideas of intelligence from formal descriptions of reasoning processes. Brooks 
proposed the behavioural model of intelligence called situated intelligence. Situated 
intelligence is theorized as a process that can effect change in the environment in which it 
is situated (Brooks, 1991). Later, Katherine Hayles (1999) dealt with the cultural and 
discursive histories of first order cybernetics and how human engagement with these 
technologies actually produced what has been referred to as the posthuman.
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Functional analysis relies on conceptual models of intelligent behaviour upon which all 
observations are based, rather than observations from which all conceptualizations are 
drawn. In Brooks’ words:
Man arrived in roughly his present form 2.5 million years ago. He invented agriculture a mere 10,000 years 
ago, writing less than 5000 years ago and expert knowledge only over the last few hundred years. This 
suggests that problem solving behaviour, language, expert knowledge and application, and reason, are all 
pretty simple once the essence of being and reacting are available. That essence is the ability to move 
around in a dynamic environment, sensing the surroundings to a degree sufficient to achieve the necessary 
maintenance of life and reproduction. (Brooks, 1991:139-159)
Models of intelligence
From ancient times models of intelligence relied upon representation. Individuals or 
humans were thought to name objects they saw by selecting a word associated with a 
memory that best resembled an object of interest in their visual field. The action of 
choosing a memory from the set of all memories an individual might have is described as a 
cognitive process.
Much of the literature of mechanical intelligence draws upon two distinct understandings of 
human cognitive processes. In the Aristolian or classic tradition each concept formulated 
from perception is bounded by a set of essential features that enable its classification. In 
the second, concepts are formulated according to remembered experiences of similar 
perceptions.  The first view relies upon the existence of a natural superset of concepts that 
all individuals access. The second is experiential and relies upon individual interpretations 
of experience.
The role of concepts in cognitive processes has been the subject of inconclusive inquiry in 
empirical philosophy. Since Descarte’s speculations about the self and thought processes, 
cognition has been theorized as an essentially private process.
Practitioners know the limitations of both theorizations of cognition. Indeed, according to 
Stephen Wilson, the objection (to Aristotle) was the claim that we somehow have access 
to entities that lie outside the realm of ordinary experience. (Wilson, 1997:374) 
Immanuel Kant conjectured that
what we experience as reality relies upon preconceived mental categories, although Kant thought of these 
categories as stable and transcendent (Lyle,1993:90 -106) 
Contrary to Kant’s notion of mental categories, John F. Sowa proposes-
Concepts are inventions of the human mind used to construct a model of the world. They package reality into 
discrete units for further processing, they support powerful mechanisms for doing logic, and they are 
indispensable for precise, extended chains of reasoning. But concepts and percepts cannot form a perfect 
model of the world - they are abstractions that select features that are important for one purpose, but they 
ignore details and complexities that may be just as important for some other purpose.  (1984:344). 
Humans were known to function despite serious cognitive impairments. Maurice Merleau-
Ponti (1989) recalls experiments where individuals were equipped with eyeglasses that 
inverted their field of vision. He reports that after initial disorientation the subjects were 
able to "recognize" objects in their field of vision as their memories adjusted to their new 
perceptions of the world and after a time they were able to function as they had before 
their vision was turned upside down. 
Georges Rey encapsulates the situation concerning discussions of concepts in this way: 
25
We might summarize the present situation with regard to candidates for concepts that have been discussed 
here as follows: there is the token representation in the mind or brain of an agent, types of which are shared 
by different agents. These representations could be words, images, definitions, or   prototypes   that play 
specific inferential roles in an agents cognitive system and stand in certain causal and covariant relations to 
phenomena in the world. By virtue of these facts, such representations become associated with an extension 
in this world, possibly an intension that determines an extension in all possible worlds, and possibly a 
property that all objects in all such extensions have in common. Which of these entities one selects to be 
concepts depends on the explanatory work one wants concepts to perform. Unfortunately, there is as yet 
little agreement on precisely what that work might be. (Rey, 1995:192)
Both classical and empirical theorization of concepts rely upon action models where the 
senses are located at the body's periphery and are interpreted in some notional centre that 
processes stimuli received from the environment and guides the body's extremities in 
response. In a simple action model a person walking toward a wall will perceive it, 
compare it to all similar walls that they have seen, conceptualize it as a barrier and instruct 
the legs to move the body parallel to the wall to avoid colliding with it.
There have been many experiments with mechanisms that have been programmed with 
mathematical encodings of their environments. Blockworld, Cyc and Deep Blue, the chess-
playing computer built by IBM to defeat chess grand-masters, are perhaps the most 
familiar examples. However, such mechanisms have often failed in complete 
environments. Boris Spassky likened his chess match with Deep Blue to playing the game 
with a hospital patient on life support (Fen-Hsiung, 2002) The Blockworld algorithm copes 
well if everything is block-shaped, and Cyc remains lifeless after twenty-five years work.
Although an art gallery can be arranged in a series of shapes that lend themselves to 
mathematical representation, and an audience can be directed with signage to stand in a 
particular location in order to be recognized by a machine to trigger behaviour such an 
approach has been discredited both in theory by Brooks, and in our own previous practice, 
for example with intelligence as language in the prosthetic heads.
In nonrepresentational representations of intelligent behaviours, actions are defined in two 
or more behaviours engineered to compete for the attention of the whole system. Simple 
wall avoiding behaviour is engineered from one layer that is programmed to always move 
forward in long, slight arc and another that moves backward a bit and turns a little. This 
creates a set of behaviours consistent with those needed to avoid randomly colliding with 
walls by allowing the moving forward behaviour to subsume the operations of the robot 
unless the system senses an obstacle, in which case control of the system is subsumed by  
the backing up and turning behaviour. 
Such behaviours function by relying only upon input from the environment. Such 
behaviours can therefore be compared to, but are not in fact autonomic reflexes. For this 
project the system is realized as an autonomous robot placed on a dais in Heide Museum 
of Modern Art, in Melbourne Australia. The robot may walk on the dais, but it may not climb 
off.
Autonomous robot
In our abstract example of a robot avoiding collisions with a wall the input from the 
environment is interpolated from the operation of sensors that detect obstacles. The 
sensor sends a signal ‘off’ while there is no obstacle sensed, or ‘on’ if an obstacle is 
detected. While the input from the sensors is off the robot walks forward. Whereas, when 
the input is on, the robot retreats backwards and turns. The combination of behaviours and 
sensors creates an impression of purposeful motion. Brooks calls his autonomous robots 
creatures.
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It is only the observer of the Creature who imputes a central representation or central control. The Creature 
itself has none; it is a collection of competing behaviours. Out of the local chaos of their interactions there 
emerges, in the eye of an observer, a coherent pattern of behaviour. There is no central purposeful locus of 
control. (Brooks, 1991, p.139-159) 
Proposing intelligent embodiment as being without any central, purposeful action that is 
considered control challenges accounts of human existence that rely upon such concepts. 
We undertake the construction of this robot because it is an interesting vehicle with which 
to engage with ideas about intelligence. We can literally act out theoretical issues by 
exhibiting the robot on a podium in an art gallery. 
Stelarc, in particular, applies prosthesis on top of prosthesis so that it is difficult to see 
where one prosthetic ends and another begins. My own interests in the rhetorics of 
intelligence are represented in the explicit illustration and reversal of the Cartesian mind 
body split.
The prosthetic head is obviously a virtual entity; whereas the pneumatic robot body is 
audibly physical. The head is on a flat screen carried on the chassis of the robot. The flat 
screen rotates from side to side and the virtual head can spin around.
The mechanism as a whole creates the impression of something which is alive but which 
should not be, reviving the Frankenstein myth. 
Movement by the legs stimulates the prosthetic head, reversing usual paradigms of 
embodied behaviours. It is difficult not to view such behaviours as purposeful or intelligent 
in a similar way to descriptions of animals as purposeful or intelligent. Moby Dick, Lassie, 
Skippy and Flipper exemplify such anthropomorphizing. This view is challenged by the 
explicitly mechanical audiovisual components of the installation.
I have always shunned the photo real in my virtual reality work. I have attempted to 
overwhelm senses with computer-generated imagery, rather than cheat them with a false 
vision. Stelarc, however, leverages the hyper-real qualities of computer-generated imagery 
in his Prosthetic Head and Extra Ear augmentation projects. Where my own work is often 
reflective of its digitally constructed origins, my work with Stelarc aims for the hyper-real 
properties that are a hallmark of the prosthetic. Our collaborative plan is to creatively meet 
in the middle, allowing me less synthetic idealism into the simulation and to allow Stelarc 
to reveal the mechanical aspect of the prosthetic head technology.
Working with situated autonomous agents has also allowed me to complete my own 
personal project to abandon time-based media. The Vocalizing Avatar responds to its 
environment millisecond by millisecond in a complete contrast to paradigms of cinema. It 
is, as Roland Barthes foresaw, a working, rather than reading, text (Barthes:1974).
Walking Head Project and situated intelligence
I want to briefly discuss the Walking Head project in terms of situated intelligence. 
However the same installation is dealt with at length in another chapter.
The Walking Head is visually similar to the Hexapod (formerly bio-robot) project, 
mentioned in Zylinska (2002). However, where Hexapod relied upon the presence of a 
human body to direct its operations, the Walking Head is autonomous and reacts to 
human presence with a performance.
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The performance arises from a combination of behaviours that the robot is programmed 
with. The behaviours follow the paradigm of subsumption architecture, outlined in Brooks 
(1991), where behaviours are arranged as layers in a hierarchy stimulated by input from 
the environment.
Behavours form the basis of design in a situated intelligence. A software algorithm 
incorporating Brooks’ subsumption architecture was implemented in the C language and 
tested as part of this project. 
The algorithm relies upon movement in a rich sensory environment. 
A small-wheeled mobile robot was constructed and programmed with a simple imperative 
to move toward light. A passive infrared sensor tuned to the same infrared signature as the 
human body fires a second behaviour called ‘follow’ when it is repeatedly triggered.
Vocalization was one of the behaviours for the prosthetic head series.  The head vocalizes 
in a process that reads each phoneme as it is synthesized, interpolates the phoneme to a 
particular shape of the human mouth identified in empirical research by Bell Laboratories, 
and renders that shape on the screen as the vocalization is uttered.
A prototype language synthesizer was constructed as part of my youRobot project. 
Developing a software prototype of the Walking Head vocalization system that included a 
genetic algorithm to structure a string of utterances extended upon earlier techniques.
A prototype software interface was developed to link a set of musical tones to the audio 
produced by parsing each phoneme.
The following behaviour attempts to keep the heat signature as strong as possible. If it 
detects a person moving off it attempts to follow it, otherwise it will move as close as 
possible to a person and make beeping sounds.
When it cannot detect any heat signatures from the person the robot deploys passive 
photometric sensors constructed with photosensitive resistors and software interpolation to 
attempt to get as close as possible to the strongest light source it can find.
The algorithm was tested and refined extensively at the AIM Centre during 2001 and 2002 
as part of an evaluation of sensing devices for this project. It is a robust strategy for 
autonomous robots and was adopted as a design paradigm for the walking head for its 
potential to produce many interesting visual and audible behavioural variants.
The Walking Head robot
The Walking Head robot will detect humans with an ultrasonic sensor that sends out an 
audio click at a set frequency and measures the time it takes for the click to echo back 
from surrounding objects. Since sound waves travel at a fixed speed, the time a sound 
takes to be echoed to the sensor can be interpolated to distance. By repeatedly altering 
the angle of the ultrasonic sound relative to the robot, software can build an ultrasound 
map of the environment based upon measurements to environmental features interpolated 
from the sensor readings. A feature of the map that changes quickly over time is assumed 
by the artists to be a human being within the context of the art gallery.
A confirming passive infrared sensor could be installed in order for the mechanism to 
authenticate the artists' theory that the only freely moving object in the gallery will be 
human.
28
While there is nobody in the gallery the legs are at rest. When its sensors detect a human 
the robot will begin to move. Movement in the legs will cause the screen to turn from side 
to side and cause the virtual reality software to vocalize. 
The mechanism has no conceptual representation of the world at all yet its behaviour 
appears purposeful. It will avoid falling from its podium, yet it possesses no idea of heights, 
the podium, art or life. The only sensory input into the robot is interpolated from ultrasound.
Clearly the mechanism is not alive; however its behaviour and aliveness challenge 
conventional ideas about intelligence and representation. The mechanism cannot reason 
yet it displays behaviour that suggests that it can. If we are to assume that it is not 
intelligent then how does it know to stay on the podium? If it is intelligent why does it stay 
on the podium? These questions are existential; they are difficult to answer without 
treating the mechanism as a living thing.
In the installation representations of the living and not living are realized concurrently. The 
machine acts as if it is alive yet it is clearly made from hardware materials that 
characterize "not living" things. The screen-based animated component is a familiar 
signifier of software, yet the near-human renderings and scale of the head hint at a human 
presence.  
The robot's walking movements allow it to occupy a much larger space than its own mass. 
Its vocalizations suggest some kind of expansion of mechanical purpose. The mechanism 
is literally performing some of the concepts of posthumanism, put forth by utopians, such 
as Donna Haraway and Hans Moravic, who suggest that human-like sentient life is 
possible without the sociopolitical weight of a human body. These ideas are not new. 
Eighteenth century Humanist philosopher Julian De LaMettre had proposed a society of 
robots that would live together in perfect harmony, free from the animal nature of human 
beings (De La Mettre: 1912). 
The robot exhibits autonomy and represents a kind of creationist anti-myth popularized in 
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus, where humans do assume the 
role of creator. It simultaneously challenges the outcomes proposed by Shelly that such 
creations produce disastrous consequences. Frankenstein's creature watched a family to 
learn human ways. By contrast, this robot goes to sleep (or is inactivated) when there is no 
human presence. Stelarc has proposed that ...we fear what we have always been and 
what we have already become (Stelarc, 2002b). That fear was explored by Freud, who 
proposed that autonomous movement where none is expected arouses what modern 
psychology calls a "startle response”, activating the human autonomic (limbic) systems 
fight or flight reflex. Sigmund Freud refers to moving objects that cause such responses as 
uncanny (Freud: 1997).
It is perhaps ironic that a modern mechanism that moves purposefully in the world without 
any concept of its surroundings should arouse such deep discussions. It is not so much 
that the installation presents a surface upon which to inscribe those concepts, which it 
does, but more interestingly the robot can literally perform the concepts arising from 
references to human/not human binaries in discourse.
A post-structural reading of the text this robot gives will, at a glance, offer some evidence 
that identity is a cultural construct. If, as the robot’s behaviours suggest, there is some goal 
that the robot’s movements seek out, is that goal something humans cannot understand 
and therefore does the robot present evidence of the posthuman? 
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However, such readings are inconclusive because if the robot’s behaviours are evidence 
of the posthuman then it is ourselves that are reconstructed around that idea, rather than 
the mechanism. This would seem to offer evidence that we are unstable identities 
constructed by culture rather than making culture ourselves.
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CHAPTER 3: GNU NOT NEW
Following from discussions in chapter three on movement in the robotic structure of the 
six-legged walking machines, in this chapter I will investigate the problematic associated 
with repetitive tasks, which has been associated since the Industrial Revolution with the 
idea of a mindless robot or monstrous other. I draw upon academic, literary and filmic 
sources in order to tease out the legacy of Cartesian dualism, which separated the 
reasoning mind from a machine-like body.
In this chapter I am concerned with events that affect my own practice as a so-called ‘new 
media artist’, and will restrict my comments to the Australian context for new media.
Art history has always privileged new ways of seeing over new ways of doing. However, 
my concern in this chapter is that new media does not look new. I accept that calling new 
media new, and establishing the New Media Arts Fund was a political strategy, rather than 
a visual one. It was a strategic move, by former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, 
that signified at once what a creative nation we are, and how grateful he was to the arts 
community for its support in winning an ‘unwinnable’ election.2 I am interested in 
investigating here some consequences that have followed from those politics. I will refocus 
from the present emphasis on the future of new media to conceptualizations of politics and 
philosophy emerging from discourses on new media. In particular, I am interested tracing 
the genealogy of the term’s use in an Australian context.
Is new media really new? Is it novel, of a kind never seen? Is it peerless, having no 
previous precedent or example? How does new media fit with history?
These questions are probes into the technosphere; questions that allow answers to 
emerge from eminent new media and cultural critics.
Is ‘New Media’ New?
Despite the dazzling array of new electronic media objects available, new media of itself is 
not avant-garde. Calling new media new is a context error of the kind proposed by both 
Wittgenstien (1961 )and Frege (1967). Often contrasted as opposing philosophers, both 
agreed that language relies upon context to create meaning (Wright:1983).
Calling new media new is an attack on the media that is similar to the attacks by one 
philosophical school on the shortcomings of another. The pioneers of mass media, the 
Beaverbrooks, Sarnoffs and Hearsts, would be aghast at the folksonomic3  authority of the 
Wikipedia. Sarnoff, in particular, looked to broadcast media to disseminate high culture for 
the intellectual and moral salvation of the American middle classes. Theodore Adorno 
(1976) castigated public taste while he worked for the CBS network. Those prophets of 
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2 So certain was the Australian Labour Party in 1993 of its forthcoming electoral defeat, that in victory 
Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating was moved to assert "This is one for the true believers"
3 Folksonomy is a neologism for a practice of collaborative categorization using freely chosen keywords. 
More colloquially, this refers to a group of people cooperating spontaneously to organize information into 
categories. In contrast to formal classification methods, this phenomenon typically only arises in 
nonhierarchical communities, such as public websites, as opposed to multilevel teams. Since the organizers 
of the information are usually its primary users, advocates of folksonomy believe it produces results that 
reflect more accurately the population's conceptual model of the information.
high culture have been swept aside in theorization of media as new, in favor of taxonomies 
based upon common understanding. We are left with a question: Is there a place for art in 
a postindustrial technotopia?
Although we call new media new, there is little evidence that new media offers new ways 
of seeing. Does it then offer any new interpretation of the world of any kind? 
Lev Manovich figures that the audiovisual style of new media closely follows the style of 
industrialized Europe in the 1920s, when
all key modern visual communication techniques were developed: photo and film montage, collage, classical 
film language, surrealism, the use of sex appeal in advertisement, modern graphic design, modern 
typography.
and asks
If historically each cultural period (Renaissance, Baroque, and so on) brought with it new forms, new 
expressive vocabulary, why is the computer age satisfied with using the languages of the previous period, in 
other words, that of the industrial age? 4
If we see new media as a challenge to the shortcomings of old media, then we can begin 
to answer this important question.
Previous notions of New Media
Eighteenth century Humanist philosopher De La Mettrie had proposed a society of robots 
that would live together in perfect harmony, free from the animal nature of human beings 
(De La Mettrie:1912). Scientific projects have historically sometimes produced new media, 
like the artificial languages Esperanto (spoken) or SolReSol (whistled)5 . Esperanto and 
SolReSol were constructed in the hope that scientific improvements of natural utterance 
would be followed by natural improvements in human relations.  It was imagined that 
scientific improvements in linguistics could overcome war, if only people spoke a common 
tongue. We can imagine constructed languages like Esperanto and SolReSol as a 
software upgrade, an update to an unstable operating system, the human mind. 
With similar aspirations, imagining hypertext, America’s chief scientist Vannevar Bush 
wrote in 1945
Consider a future device for individual use, which is a sort of mechanized private file and library.  It needs a 
name, and to coin one at random, `memex' will do.  A memex is a device in which an individual stores all his 
books, records, and communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding 
speed and flexibility.  It is an enlarged intimate supplement to his memory. (Bush:1945,7)
Bush was proposing a prosthetic, an upgrade to the human mind. Echoing De La Mettrie 
and other constructors of new media, he fervently hopes that technological innovation will 
cause utopia because -
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4 Manovich L  ‘Avant Garde as Software’ http://www.uoc.edu/artnodes/eng/art/manovich1002/
manovich1002.html (Accessed) January 1 2007
5  The international auxiliary language Esperanto was invented by a Polish eye-specialist, Dr. Lazarus 
Ludovic Zamenhof and first appeared in 1887.He wanted a neutral language to bring together the Russian, 
Polish, German and Jewish sections of the area he lived in, as he felt that the mutual hatred between these 
peoples was increased by the lack of a common means of communication. At first his language went by the 
name "Lingvo Internacia de la Doktoro Esperanto", but this was soon shortened to just Esperanto, a word in 
the language itself meaning "one who hopes". http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/5037/Esp.html
Presumably man's spirit should be elevated if he can better review his shady past and analyze more 
completely and objectively his present problems. (Bush:1945,9)
The war-weary editors of Atlantic Monthly agreed:
Now, says Dr. Bush, instruments are at hand which, if properly developed, will give man access to and 
command over the inherited knowledge of the ages. The perfection of these pacific instruments should be 
the first objective of our scientists as they emerge from their war work. (Introduction to Bush:1945,1)
Language
We might now be able to partly reframe Manovich`s question. If new media does not 
challenge old ways of seeing, as the avant-garde did, does it provide a means to review 
our shady past with a view to revising our future behaviour, as Van Bush suggested? The 
producers of Escape from Woomera 6 certainly think so. If so it is a purely political 
enterprise. Escape from Woomera can be comprehended as a political dialectic using the 
tools of critical theory developed by Foucault (1972) and Derrida (1978). It can be 
deconstructed in terms of the language that describes it, and the discourse that surrounds 
it, and what its texts leave out7. 
The Anthony Burgess book and Stanley Kubrick film A Clockwork Orange (1971) uses 
elaborate archaic language to signify the protagonists’ alienation from postindustrial 
society. If we see new media as a dialectic, as comprising at once its thesis and antithesis, 
then we can begin to comprehend new media as a thesis, and its content an antithesis 
that uses the archaic but overtly political language of the early twentieth century to signify 
its rejection of the current political climate. If there is a place for art in the kind of 
mechanical dystopias imagined by de La Mettrie and Bush is it the kind of art that even its 
makers repudiate, as Kubrick did with A Clockwork Orange?
The hope of new media’s most fervent proponents (Nelson:1973,1974,1990) and 
(Landow:1992) was that it would provide a technotopia of informed consent. The citizenry, 
equipped with "pacific instruments", "knowledge of the ages", and "elevated" spirit (Bush:
1945), would logically prefer peace to war, stability to revolution, making to breaking. Was 
this wishful thinking?
Which modes of study seek to sever their themes from history or to separate one part of a 
discourse from another? Metaphysical theology; political ideology; dogmas; utopian visions 
are some which allow no dialectic or synthesis of oppositions to emerge?  One can never 
contradict dogma, for instance; one can never raise an antithesis, for that would 
acknowledge change and dogma can never change. A recurring feature of dogma is its 
claim to uniqueness and its march toward ubiquity. Another recurring characteristic of 
dogma is censorship, and classifications of knowledge as binary oppositions. All of these 
features are prominent in discussions of trash culture and new media (Nelson:1992) 
(Creed:1993).
Is new media, then, simply a sign of alienation or indicative of a deep longing for stability, 
peace, order and safety? Those virtues are what Van Bush and the editors of Atlantic 
Monthly fervently hoped for the world at the end of World War Two. Are those high hopes 
dashed with the onset of the twenty-first Century and the War on Terror? 
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6 http://www.escapefromwoomera.org/faq.htm (Accessed) January 1 2007
7 Foucault in particular writes in detail about the processes of contextualization operational in collections of 
knowledge. In critical theory it is not only the object of study that raises questions, the mode of study is itself 
significant and the modes of specification of the modes of study more significant again.
Like many schools of thought before it, post-modernity is a critique of all preceding 
philosophies. The perception, after World War Two, that scientific method had failed in its 
promise of order, stability, peace, safety and continuity, led to widespread disillusionment, 
especially with philosophical truth. Truth became understood as a matter of perspective, 
where previously it had been thought a matter of fact.
Can we really control our own destiny in these uncertain times, or is it already mapped by 
incomprehensible forces, like the wars, famines, disease, and death that characterized our 
collective, shady past?
Postmodernism
Postmodernism has made us strangers in our own culture. The certainty of our intellectual 
inheritance has been challenged by Elizabeth Grosz (1995) and our comfortable social 
heritage has been challenged by Germaine Greer (1972). Postcolonial theory throws our 
shady past in sharp relief against the culture we thought we were. The posthuman 
highlights our physical infirmities with mechanical replacements (Clarke 2002:2). Our 
intellects are increasingly challenged by the ingenuity of our machines (Haraway:1991). 
Our positions are continually undermined by workplace automation (Kibby:1996). The 
pompous certainty of our colonial origins has been vaporized by postindustrial shock and 
awe (Deleuze and Guattari:1987) Yet it is as if we look to mechanical processes for our 
salvation.
The rise of new media fits comfortably with the ascent of postmodernism. It is announced, 
like a guest, rather than understood, like a familiar face. It demands action, not 
contemplation; contrives fragmentation, not unity; allows equality of voice but not of 
discourse; is a protagonist of binary oppositions; a media quite suited to materialism.8 
It is common nowadays to explicitly deride humanist ideas about society, the family, the 
family tree, and mummy, daddy, me, as 'Oedipal' longings (Delueze and Guattari:1983). 
Rational humanism, especially psychology, unable to restrain, explain or otherwise 
mitigate the terrible tragedies of the twentieth century, has been widely condemned and 
partly discredited by posthumanist projects like that of Delueze and Guattari (1983) and by 
the feminist projects of Germaine Greer (1972) and Elizabeth Grosz (1995).
I interpret much of this work as a longing for separation from patriarchal politics and 
globalized economic imperialism reprised by Donna Haraway when she says ‘I’d rather be 
a cyborg than a goddess’. (Haraway 1991). 
I am engaged by a paper from the Blogtalk Downunder 2005 conference by Ben Hoh that 
describes working with traumatized refugees, and how new media, in this case the weblog, 
was so appropriate to interpret their fragmented, dissociated, memories.
But against conventional narrative therapy s humanist concept of externalization through storytelling, which 
attempts to extricate a pre-existing, coherent subject from systems of power, our opening of the can of 
worms that comes with traumatic memory was always about leveraging the aggregative, fragmentary 
potentials of the blogging medium, which tend away from the assumption of unities.9
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8 "My God! Its full of ads!" Philip Fry, a character from the television cartoon series Futurama, on 
experiencing the internet for the first time ‘A Bicyclops Made For Two’  (2000) Futurama Fox Television Matt 
Groening (Producer) Ep.11, Season 2, March 19 (premiere)
9 Ben Hoh http://www.antipopper.com. Accessed 9/12/2007
I take the view that the de-categorization of media as new was preceded by the de-
categorization of our places in what Julia Kristeva [1982] called the symbolic order of 
things, and this is why the fragmentary experience of new media has such great appeal to 
the traumatized, shocked, and displaced; the alone, the abject; because it ‘...is what 
remains when you take everything away’.  (Deleuze and Guattari:1987)
and
is the most rapidly evolving, exciting, subversive and feared cultural medium in the world today. It's akin to 
graffiti on the cultural landscape. As such it is ripe for an injection of interesting and progressive ideas that 
can effect social change.10
Interior structures
Winner (1986) and Scarry (1985) have commented at length on the inseparability of 
politics and technology. Both aver that the politics inherent in technologies, what Elaine 
Scarry has characterized as 'the interior structure of artifacts', reciprocate human longing 
for status, shelter, and stability that we comprehend as civilization (Scarry:1985). 
However perfect our imaginings of it technology is often experienced as a double-edged 
blade. Elaine Scarry characterizes technology as at once the Biblical staff (with healing 
powers) and the sword (with wounding powers) of God; handled without compassion and 
care, it harms us (Scarry:1985). New media is said to contribute to epidemics of violent 
crime (in Grand Theft Auto), or obesity, or even terrorism.11 Critical theory, for so long the 
mainstay of cultural studies, is now often thought dangerous. Critical theorists respond to 
society with feminist deconstructions of patriarchal power (Greer, 1972) (Grosz, 1995), 
posthumanist descriptions of bodies without organs (Delueze & Guattari, 1987), and minds 
without souls (Haraway:1991).  Bernard Williams has likened the arguments of critical 
theorists to a shock and awe tactics, a "creeping barrage" of anti-orthodoxies (Wiiliams, 
2002). 
At the end of 1945 Europe was in ruins, and with it some traditions of European thought 
that had previously been unassailable. Philosophy and rational thought had failed to 
prevent the catastrophes that war had wrought in the first half of the twentieth century. The 
second half was punctuated by recriminations.  Sartre, Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Derrida, 
and Baudrillard essentially condemned all preceding philosophies. Delueze and Guattari 
savaged all philosophy for its failures. Western thought entered the postmodern era. 
Postmodernism has left us refugees in our own culture, much as the European 
philosophers found themselves after WW2.
Previous philosophies had proposed that all things could be known through study. 
Postmodernists adopted the position that nothing could be known for sure, and Western 
thought entered a period of uncertainty. Postmodern society is mobile and fluid. Our 
participation in it is an uncertain experience characterized by alienation and loss (Delueze 
and Guattari:1987). Postmodern uncertainties are amplified by the essential premise of 
Critical Theory that there is no real world outside language, and therefore no truth beyond 
our descriptions of it. 
Vannevar Bush imagined the Memex as centuries of philosophy lay in ruins alongside the 
cities of Europe.
35
10  http://www.escapefromwoomera.org/index.html (Accessed) January 1 2007
11 Haganah - The Iraeli Secret Police http://haganah.org.il/haganah/  (Accessed) July 20 2007
The reconstruction of Europe after World War Two was accompanied by attempts to re-
conceptualize European philosophy. Ideas previously thought necessary to control 
technology - essentially those of Western European liberal philosophy - became reviled in 
post-modernity. Sartre was feted during the Paris student uprising of 1968, the USA was 
humiliated in Vietnam, and with it Roosevelt’s New Deal. The science of Dialectical 
Materialism fell with the Berlin Wall, and organized labour with it.
In the course of war at least one side must undergo a perceptual reversal...in which claims or issues or 
elements of self-understanding that had seemed integral or essential to national identity will gradually seem 
dispensable or alterable... (Scarry, 1985:93) 
The 'new' therefore reflects a desire to break from ideas that, in the agonies of victory and 
defeat, are discredited. But are the new philosophies and media a genuine historical 
rupture or simply a manifestation of the agonies that follow displacement and dislocation?
It is easy to forget that among the first of the old technologies to be digitized were the 
media. In the print media, a generation of workers, overwhelmingly male, were displaced 
by girls operating computers (Kibby:1996). The destruction of centuries of privilege and 
position in the printing and kindred industries and the associated riots and their violent 
suppression, are only a microcosm of the generalized agonies of postindustrial workplace 
restructuring that "...proliferated an established theme that pitted human values against the 
presumed non-values of technology and mechanisation”  (Kibby,1996:1).
Is it any wonder that, as Manovich remarks, the images of new media are those of the 
nineteen-twenties, for the preoccupations of the start of the twenty-first century are 
remarkably similar to those of the start of the twentieth. 
It is more inevitable than ironic that a studied coupling of computers and critical theory 
promoted in Landow and Nelson as “liberating” has been subsumed, for the present, in the 
study of current political events. The New Media Arts Board decision to produce Escape 
From Woomera 12  multimedia software, described as a comment on the present 
Australian Government’s immigration policies, is seen as a key precursor to the New 
Media Arts Board’s abolition.13   Given the political origins of the New Media Arts Board its 
demise was inevitably political, for despite all rhetoric (Haraway:1991), imagining a thing 
as being outside history, and therefore beyond the reach of historical political forces, does 
not make it so.
When we call new media new do we mean it is immature, like new potatoes - unfamiliar, 
like a flying saucer - new fangled, like a biometric identity card? New media used to be 
incubated, as if it were new life struggling to thrive.
Is new media new in the sense that it is a modern language, like 'Modern' English evolved 
from 'Old' English? If new media evolved from the old as a matter of course then what is its 
evolutionary purpose?  Is new media new in the sense that it is a constructed language, 
like Esperanto and SolReSol, evolved from rational principles for a greater good? If so, 
why would we construct it?
It is common nowadays to assert that people are the ultimate determiners of value. It is not 
always so. Many projects adopt absolutism, for instance metaphysical determinism 
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12 http://www.escapefromwoomera.org/faq.htm
13 The Age, Melbourne, May 2 2003
(theology, where God is in charge) or despotism (dogma, where a dictator rules), as a set 
of guiding principles.
Large parts of the humanist project, for example science and mathematics, are 
demonstrably concerned with those infrastructures which promote human well-being, like 
medical science or civil engineering. Theorists, exemplified by Francis Fukuyama, often 
figure some outcomes (longevity, good health) of the humanist project as simply results of 
deterministic (natural/metaphysical) forces. Fukuyama refers to evolution; others explicitly 
thank God for townhouses and indoor plumbing. It is customary to credit Protagoras (ca 
481 BC) with the defeat of metaphysical determinism as a material science, but we see the 
protagonists of determinism versus personal agency in debate today, for example in 
discussions between the so-called evolutionary and creation sciences over history, or in 
the discourse on the metaphysics of numbers contested by Wittgenstein and Frege,14 and 
in the polemics of the New World Order (Fukuyama,1991).
Humanist projects are generally conceptualized as promoting human agency over 'forces' 
presumed natural, like hunger, poverty and disease. It has often been in conflict with 
authorities whose very wealth and power issued from exploiting hunger, poverty, and 
disease. How are we to adequately interpret and evaluate the rise of digital media as new, 
against a backdrop of globalism, surveillance and anxiety?
Critical theory, before its entanglements with new media, sought preeminence over all 
other philosophical methods dealing with such questions.15 To answer them we should 
liberate critical theory from its technological entanglements, and begin to grapple with the 
embodied, not virtual, twenty-first century experience.
We must now begin the attempt to place new media in some general philosophical and 
historical contexts as a precursor to what must surely follow, because our work will 
become as interesting as yesterdays news, now that the New Media Arts Fund is 
abolished, unless we can find a place for it in history generally, the history of thought more 
specifically, and art history in particular. To do less will be to deny the reality of our own 
existence.
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14 Frege asserted that numbers exist independently of human though and agency. Wittgenstien rejected the 
argument, proposing instead that numbers only exist through human thought and agency. If we accept that 
the new media truly evolved from old media as a matter of course, then we are attesting to history as a 
natural force; or as an act of God, producing numbers and new media as 'natural' phenomena.
15 I mean critical theory that is based on the premise that there is no real world outside language, and 
therefore no truth beyond our descriptions of ideas or events.  Like many schools of thought, that limb of 
critical theory is essentially a critique of all inquiries that preceded it. It originated in the so-called Frankfurt 
School of German Philosophy in the 1930s. The Frankfurt School, and its founder Horkhiemer, sought to 
amend the mistakes of positivism (the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (from the period of the Tractatus), 
materialism (Descartes), and phenomenology (Edmund Husserl: Logical Investigations; first edition, 
1900-1901; Martin Heidegger: Being and Time) by returning to Hegel’s theories of synthesis through 
discourse (The Dialectics), which they linked to Marx and Engel`s work "History in The German Ideology", 
published in 1932 by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow . Later, Freud and Weber in came to have great 
influence over critical theory, for example in works like Marcuse`s Eros and Civilization 
CHAPTER 4: THE WALKING HEAD ROBOT 
Like the youRobot discussed in a previous chapter, the Walking Head (a virtual head on a 
flat screen) brings together several strands in the research, as well as individual 
preoccupations of myself and Stelarc. Some of these research interests relate to the 
extension of bipedal motion through multiple limbs and technological augmentation; 
posthumanism, species intelligence and changing ideas of the human. Whereas the 
youRobot is a finished work, the Walking Head is a work in progress.
Collaboration 
Stelarc, Lars Vaupel and myself, have collaborated in various ways on the design and 
manufacture of walking machines and other robotic devices since 1998. The robot, which 
was expensive to make and to exhibit, exemplifies the risks and difficulties of working in 
the genre. The technology is perhaps not robust enough for continuous exhibition over a 
period of months.  It had to be manufactured in Europe because there is no comparable 
available expertise in Australia. Some software was produced in Australia, as there was no 
comparable or available expertise in Germany. Also, the design, construction and 
implementation were constrained by available time and funding and language also proved 
an unexpected barrier when the operating system of the robot was delivered in German. 
Construction
The Walking Head was constructed from materials and ideas taken from two distinct areas 
of scientific inquiry - research into mobile robotics, and autonomous software agent 
design. Two technologies not normally associated were simultaneously presented.  
However their integration posed some major technical challenges. The manufacturer did 
not deliver the robot to the desired visual or mechanical specifications, which led to the 
robot malfunctioning for the majority of its first public exhibition at Heide Museum of 
Modern Art in Melbourne, Australia in July 2006. 
The Walking Head agent differs from the autonomous software agents constructed during 
this project because it does not interact with humans. Rather, it is programmed with a 
mechanical solipsism, where the actions of the virtual head are based upon the movement 
of the robots legs. 
Robert Michie at Edinborough University used early mobile robots, usually constructed 
with wheels rather than legs, in the study of human psychology. They are still used in the 
fields of cognitive and evolutionary psychology to develop models of nervous systems that 
might be precursors to natural behaviours. Behaviours that can be mechanically 
reproduced as responses to stimuli provide experimental simulations of life like behaviours 
amongst people and animals. In those experiments intelligence is imagined as a set of 
behaviours directed toward a comprehensible goal. 
Classificiation
The ways in which intelligence is conceptualized as behavioural is important because 
those ideas form the basis of much persuasive argument regarding mechanical 
intelligence. One proposition holds that goal-directed behaviour alone is a sign of 
intelligence, a theory rejected by Rodney Brooks, who argues that where goals are 
specified they tend to reflect the hopes, rather than real outcomes of the research.  
Brooks, proposing the model of situational intelligence, argues that a machine must learn 
from its environment to be classified intelligent. Alan Turing proposed an intelligence test 
for machines (discussed elsewhere) based simply upon what a reasonable person would 
think is intelligent. 
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The object of the work was to explore those ideas, rather than prove or disprove them, in 
terms of the discussions of the ideas by theoreticians and in the wider community. For 
example, the robot walks around its podium vocalizing as if it were alive and had some 
purpose. 
Jacques Derrida proposed that such purpose might only communicate from one human to 
another. He said, ‘…could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not 
repeat a coded or iterable utterance?’ (Derrida, 1983:191) 
Posthuman
If, as the robot’s behaviours suggest, there is some goal that it seeks, is that goal 
something humans cannot understand and therefore does the robot present evidence of 
the posthuman? It might be that such readings are inconclusive because if the robot’s 
behaviours are evidence of the posthuman then it is ourselves that are reconstructed 
around that idea, rather than the mechanism. This would seem to offer evidence of human 
beings as unstable identities constructed by culture rather than making culture, or life. 
The posthuman ontology proposed by cultural theorists is often (but not exclusively) 
described in terms of robotic and informatics electronic environments. The posthuman has 
been characterized by Arthur C Clarke in Childhoods End (1953), where humanity matures 
and vanishes from the natural world, as one incomprehensible to humans because it 
liberates them from some perceived deficiencies of human mind that prevents them from 
comprehending such states without experiencing them. Robotic and informatics 
technologies are often theorized as providing the possibility of, or the vehicle for, such 
posthuman experiences. The posthuman paradoxically exhibits humanist properties in that 
it is involved in the perfection and advancement of humanity through body modification, 
although such modifications might involve those very things (machines and animals) which 
humanists sought to set apart from the human. Further discussion of the posthuman is 
addressed in other chapters in this dissertation.
While not wishing to encumber the present work with metaphysics, posthumanists often 
appear to reflect metaphysical concerns, especially in descriptions of human minds as 
lacking some substance essential to the comprehension of such rhetoric. However, the 
polemical concerns of posthumanism are much more grounded in the physical than those 
of their metaphysical cousins in persuasion. The poetic of Proteus has been so 
persuasively remediated in and by technology that it might seem as logical now as it did to 
Ancient Greeks that one form may metamorph into another at will. 
Intelligent behaviour is often characterized in cultural texts as those that fit in with the 
behaviours of the majority of people. Behaviour that is not normative is often characterized 
as unintelligent. In the film The Wild One (Laszlo Benedek, 1953), Johnny (Marlon Brando) 
plays the leader of a biker gang who is asked what he is rebelling against. ‘What have you 
got?’ Johnny responds. Wild, untamed or unruly behaviours are often characterized as 
unintelligent, aptly demonstrated in the film. According to Michel Foucault unruly behaviour 
is often pathologized (Foucault, 1972) and non-normative behaviour is often characterized 
as unintelligent.
It is perhaps ironic that a modern mechanism that moves purposefully in the world without 
any idea of its surroundings should arouse deep discussions about human existence 
grounded on one hand in a technological poetic, and on the other hand in a sociopolitical 
critique. It is not so much that the robot presents a surface upon which to inscribe those 
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discussions, which it does, but more interestingly the installation can literally perform the 
ideas arising from references to human, not human binaries. 
Human/not human
The robotic technologies deployed in the work are complex and mechanically precise. Six 
legs are activated by the flow of compressed air, through a series of valves, into actuators 
that push and pull the legs in sequence. The robotic legs are programmed in sequences of 
movement that mechanically approximate the tripod, ripple, crab, stomp and swing walking 
gaits formalized in science from observations of the movements of creatures in the natural 
world. 
The software agent (Vocalizing Avatar) is a screen-based virtual agent created from a 
topological mesh rendered real time to a flat screen 3D video graphics array. It is animated 
by inputs from sensors that provide data to the software on the positions and angle of 
each leg section. The vocalizations by the software agent are synthesized in real time from 
data created by an evolutionary algorithm. As well as amplified sound, the synthesized 
vocalizations positively feed back into the rendering pipeline in real time. Those inputs are 
converted to digital data and feed into the rendering pipeline as polygon deformations and 
quaternion transforms to the mesh and geometry. 
The Walking Head robot detects a human presence with an ultrasonic sensor that sends 
out an audio click at a set frequency and measures the time it takes for the click to echo 
back from surrounding objects. Since sound waves travel at a fixed speed, the time a 
sound takes to be echoed to the sensor can be interpolated to distance. By repeatedly 
altering the angle of the ultrasonic sound relative to the robot, software can build an 
ultrasound map of the environment based upon measurements to environmental features 
interpolated from the sensor readings. A feature of the map that changes quickly over time 
is assumed in the implementation to be, in the context of the art gallery, a human being. 
The robot could be equipped with a passive infrared sensor to provide confirmation of its 
sonar data by detecting human body heat. 
When human movement is detected the robot performs a sequence of leg movements 
based upon those it has previously performed. The movements of the legs activate the 
movements of the virtual head, revealing a dialogue and feedback loop between the head 
and the legs. The robot becomes passive when its senses do not detect human 
movement. It is difficult not to anthropomorphize such behaviours as purposeful or 
intelligent in a similar way that animal behaviour is characterized as purposeful or 
intelligent. Animals portrayed in literature and films, such as Moby Dick, Lassie, Skippy 
and Flipper exemplify such characterizations. 
The robot creates an impression of purposeful motion, however, as Brooks proposes, 
only the observer of the Creature who imputes a central representation or central control. The Creature itself 
has none; it is a collection of competing behaviours. Out of the local chaos of their interactions there 
emerges, in the eye of an observer, a coherent pattern of behaviour. (Brooks, 1991:139-159) 
At first glance, displacing a human head from a biped’s body onto six legs might reinforce 
hierarchies of animal and human bodies proposed in humanism, where the human head is 
always in a superior position. In this work the artists attempted to subvert, through 
inversion, the normal relationships between heads and legs. For example, a common 
expression is to head in a particular direction, implying that legs are under orders from the 
head to walk that way. In this work, the legs instruct the head to move. Although this was 
the intent of the artist this strategy has not been successfully realized in the work to date.
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The mechanism is obviously not alive, however its behaviour and aliveness challenge the 
human mind to make sense of what it is seeing in terms of what is familiar to human 
embodiment. Sigmund Freud proposed that autonomous movement by an object where 
none is expected arouses what modern psychology calls a startle response, activating the 
human autonomic systems fight or flight reflex, and referred to moving objects that cause 
such responses as uncanny (Freud, 1997). While the Walking Head is guaranteed to 
invoke those responses that Freud thought as hard-wired into the human condition, the 
artists had hoped for a more subtle reading once the viewer overcomes that initial surprise. 
The human form has been modified in many cultures with technologies, such as apparel, 
surgical procedures, or the application of wooden blocks to foreheads or feet for prolonged 
periods to produce a particular shape following a culturally defined aesthetic. The use of 
computer-generated imagery has popularized such transitions, although not their 
significance, as the computer-generated morph, where one shape appears to flow 
seamlessly to another. 
Living and not-living
In the Walking Head project representations of the living and the not living are realized 
concurrently through the near human rendering of the head, and the not human body and 
movements. It is as if the installation has been frozen in a phase shift between human and 
not human. 
The machine acts as if it is alive, yet it is clearly made from hardware materials that 
characterize not living things. The screen-based animated component is a familiar signifier 
of human mediation and the near-human renderings and scale of the head hints at a 
controlling human presence. The robot's walking movements allow it to occupy a much 
larger space than its own mass and its vocalizations suggest an expansion of purpose.  
Representations of machines that assume human form are discussed elsewhere.
Robert Nelson observed of the Walking Head: 
Like all good art, these beautiful monstrosities work at different levels. On the one hand they function as 
research into movement and rhythm in relation to control systems; on the other they act out fantasies of 
beautiful imagery, which ends up quirky (Nelson, 2002:22)
Fluidity
In this work we infer, through the robot’s shape, that there are many modes of existence, 
and that the experience of those modes is protean. We make problematic human 
morphology by shape shifting the human body into a head on six legs. Referring to the 
grotesque we infer that existence is versatile, mutable and capable of many forms. Proteus 
is often associated with shape shifting in literature dealing with technology. In the Kurt 
Vonnegut novel Player Piano (1952) the central character, Paul Proteus, must change his 
nature to fit in with the mechanistic society of the company he works for. In The Demon 
Seed (Donald Cammell, 1977) the computer, named Proteus, remakes itself as part 
human. John Milton in Paradise Lost (1667), writes of invoking in various shapes old 
Proteus from the Sea - a reference both to Proteus, servant of Neptune in Greek 
mythology that could change shape at will, and to the transmutations of matter sought by 
alchemists in Milton’s time. 
The reference to water by Milton characterizes shape shifting as a fluid experience, where 
there is no abrupt transition from one morphological state to another. Fluid transitions allow 
the incorporation of more than one shape in the morphology simultaneously, as if the skin 
of a body were pulled, twisted and extruded from one shape to the next in a series of 
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transitions. Fluid morphological transitions have been visualized and popularized in culture 
through films such as Terminator II (Bruno Mattei:1990), in which one of the primary 
protagonists could take on the physical characteristics of its surrounding environment.
The artistic rendering of human body parts into non-human forms has a tradition in 
western culture that may be traced to medieval drawings of fantastic creatures in the 
margins of illuminated manuscripts. Grotesque half-human creatures are also found in the 
paintings of Hieronymus Bosch (Netherlandish Northern Renaissance Painter). The visual 
collapse of the human form into a head and legs suggests an escape from bodily 
functions. Its shape may signify the Body Without Organs discussed by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari, where existence itself is imagined as shapeless, possessing only intensity 
and flow. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980)
The mechanism has no conceptual representation of the world at all and yet its behaviour 
appears purposeful. It will normally avoid falling from its podium in an art gallery, yet it 
possesses no concept of height, the podium, art or life. The only sensory input into the 
robot is interpolated from ultrasound, and the wire that tethers it to the ceiling. 
In another reading the mechanism is literally performing some of the ideas of 
posthumanism in a theatre constructed by modern utopians, such as Donna J. Haraway 
(1991), who suggests that the sociopolitical weight of a human body can be lightened by 
adapting the human mind to live in machines. 
Haraway’s posthumanism
Haraway’s manifesto is more interesting in my opinion than most essays that support 
protean experiences because the cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history (Haraway, 
1991:150). My reading is that she imagines cyborg existence as markedly different from 
her own because the mechanical body is not subject to the same restrictions and 
proscriptions. 
I was interested in the Cyborg Manifesto because Haraway exposes her post-humanist 
project as a political one that attacks humanism. The humanist position on morphology is 
that the human form is fixed and that any deviation from that form, however minor, deforms 
not only the body but also offends the philosophies that encompass it. Haraway, in my 
opinion, blames such fixations on morphology for, amongst other things, misogyny, and it 
is persecution as a result of morphology that she seeks to escape. The Walking Head 
design presents such an escape from the human form as simultaneously beautiful and 
grotesque, as if humans were essentially protean, and as if Haraway sought to be what 
she already is. 
My reading of Haraway’s manifesto is that preoccupations with body shape, gender and 
function have subverted the humanist project to the point that she seeks to create a new 
body to escape to. Her Cyborg Manifesto is a political, rather than literal one, and one, 
which is both interesting and amusing to act out in the Walking Head. While she does not 
explicitly refer to intelligence, she implies that an intelligent person, given the opportunity 
provided by technology, might choose mechanical, rather than human hierarchies to live 
amongst. Our machines, she writes, are so lively that they make human existence, 
restricted to the one form, appear dull. 
Haraway’s work is interesting to engage with in this way. The Cyborg Manifesto 
undermines humanist rhetoric, originating in ancient times, that human morphology 
signifies intelligence in its own right, and others signify its absence. Plato, for instance, 
theorized human existence as being similar to that of a captain of a ship, where human 
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intelligence represents the captain and the human body a craft to be steered on the sea of 
life (360 BCE). Conceptualizations of living things in hierarchies, that perform repetitive 
tasks, such as slaves, pack animals, or machines, as having little or no intelligence 
compared to those in dominant hierarchical positions, is significant to this discussion 
because the coupling of a human mind with a machine proposed by Haraway, undermines 
those binary oppositions. 
The broad feminist position on humanist conceptualizations of human morphology, 
articulated by Germaine Greer, is that women are excluded from all kinds of social, cultural 
and economic position through misogynistic and voyeuristic preoccupations with the 
female body as a signifier of difference. Greer describes those preoccupations as 
castrating, a procedure performed often on slaves in the ancient world. The mechanical 
body of the cyborg would not be, could not be subjected to such atrocities.
I mention these writers because their ideas influenced the direction of my work. They cast 
the binary oppositions of human and not human in an explicitly political light I had not 
before encountered with such resonance outside of explicitly political polemic. 
Mechanical intelligence
In the Walking Head there is no captain of the ship. The movement and rhythm in the work 
are directed by examples of inside-out software engineering practice, where the robot’s leg 
movements control the expressions and motions of the virtual head on the screen rather 
than the other way around. Proposing intelligent embodiment as being without any central, 
purposeful activity that indicates control, challenges accounts of human existence that rely 
upon such ideas. The implementation of the robot closely follows current theorization of 
the most efficient engineering practice developed at the MIT Artificial Intelligence 
Laboratory. 
Those working within the field of robotics often make no distinction between behaviours 
that are intelligible and behaviours that are intelligent. They offer no metrics of lesser or 
greater intelligences beyond those proposed by Turing.  Goal directed, or purposeful, 
behaviours are assumed to be intelligent as a first principle from which all theories of 
organized behaviours continue. Such interpretations of behaviours as purposeful are 
based upon the analysis of behaviours against preconceived goals, and are offered largely 
in discourses that refer to cybernetics (for example in Margaret Mead’s address to the first 
cybernetics conference), rather than in the science itself, as proof of mechanical 
intelligence and instinct comparable to those in lesser creatures and sometimes to the 
capacities of human beings (Brooks, 1991). 
Mechanical intelligence has become a cultural phenomenon celebrated in literature, film, 
popular culture and high art. But there is such uncertainty about what intelligence is that 
those celebrations seem premature. Much of the literature of mechanical intelligence 
draws upon two distinct understandings of human cognitive processes. In the Aristolian, or 
classic, tradition each concept formulated from perception is bounded by a set of essential 
features that enable its classification. In the second, concepts are formulated according to 
remembered experiences of similar perceptions.  The first view relies upon the existence 
of a natural superset of concepts that all individuals access. The second, heuristic view 
characterizes intelligence as reliant upon individual interpretations of experience that allow 
experiences to be stored in memory and modified over time by more experiences. 
Both these theorizations may be demonstrated computationally with equal efficacy. The 
Aristolian point of view is reflected in machines like Deep Blue by IBM, capable of playing 
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chess at Grand Master level, the highest achievement in a game reliant on a very large but 
finite superset of possible moves. The heuristic view is supported in the programmed 
behaviours of software agents monitoring connections in a cellular telephone network that 
are modelled on the behaviours of insects, which forage for food that transmit messages 
regarding where food is in relation to their nest. Playing chess and sending messages are 
behaviours undertaken by human beings that are comprehensibly intelligent ones. 
However, Deep Blue can only play chess and cell-phone software can only transmit 
messages. Human beings have the capacity for much more, and that capacity is 
highlighted, rather than diminished, by machines that are so demonstrably mono-
behavioural. 
Brooks’ model of intelligence
Rodney Brooks has proposed a model of intelligence based upon a creature’s ability to 
interact successfully with its environment with multiple behaviours. A mechanical creature 
manufactured along lines suggested by Brooks will be programmed with the capacity to 
learn from its environment, rather than with a deterministic set of behaviours deployed 
before meeting an environmental challenge. As discussed previously Brooks called this 
model this situated intelligence. 
Brooks follows the same pragmatic line of inquiry as Turing that relies upon interpretations 
of the outcomes of actions, rather than speculations regarding their motivation, to provide 
a metric for intelligence (Brooks, 1991). Perhaps the most famous misconception of 
behaviours in creatures is descriptions of the suicidal tendency of the lemming to throw 
itself from a cliff when over breeding causes a crisis in its food supply. Sacrifices of 
individuals for the greater good have traditionally been admired in Western culture, and to 
exemplify such a phenomenon in nature provides confirmation that human sacrifice is 
quite natural. Such analogies between human and animal behaviours are common in 
culture, whether misconceived or not. It is unlikely Brooks had lemmings in mind when he 
proposed his model of situated intelligence, but relationships between human beings and 
nature contrasted with the treatment of nature as a force to be overcome entered 
mainstream culture and became very influential during the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Rather than taming an environment, as early Australian settlers were exhorted to, 
we now conceive of our relationship to it as a symbiosis. A situated intelligence, one that 
learns the appropriate ways to interact with the environment from its environment, more 
readily reflects modern concepts of civilized behaviour than do older concepts of intelligent 
behaviour that place humans and their environment on a collision course. Rather than 
defining a model of intelligence that overcame forces of nature with stronger mechanical 
force, Brook’s definition of intelligence, from its inception, was formulated alongside a 
redefined, and perhaps more thoughtful, but nevertheless culturally produced set of 
relationships between human beings and the natural world. 
When our ideas about intelligence change, our ideas of it are redefined along lines of 
inquiry that have currency and weight in the rhetoric of wider social and cultural discourse. 
Social, political and cultural pressures are acknowledged by Brooks to define lines of 
inquiry in the field of mechanical intelligence. A machine that learns from its environment 
rather than imposing a predetermined mechanistic order on it is a shift in rhetoric regarding 
such machines that follows shifts in cultural attitudes to the relationship between humans 
and the natural world. It is noteworthy, however, that the mathematical underpinnings of 
the construction of such machines remain as they have since the time of Euclid, who 
pragmatically laid out the lines such creatures, must compute to navigate the world. 
Rather, it is the ways in which they are characterized that have changed. 
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If mathematical abilities were evidence of intelligence then we could conclude, with some 
certainty, that computers are intelligent. Without such evidence we are forced to look for 
intelligence elsewhere. Our lived experience provides clues what we should look for if we 
begin to divide humans from not humans. Before we look for evidence of mind we should 
be aware of cultural imperatives programmed into ourselves that might prevent us from 
correctly identifying it in others. 
If behaviours and mathematics together provide evidence-supporting intelligence, then by 
the rhetoric that permeates discourses on machine intelligence the walking head is 
convincingly intelligent. Yet if it is, what right do we have to place an intelligent creature on 
a podium to perform like a dancing bear?  If its makers are intelligent then, echoing Obe-
Wan Kenobe in Star Wars III, Revenge of the Sith (Dir. George Lucas, 2005), why are we 
having so many problems? 
The Walking Head robot was made to explore such issues. It relies upon cultural 
preoccupations with mechanical intelligences popularized in films such as Star Wars 
(George Lucas, 1977) as much as it relies upon an extensive historical body of inquiry by 
the natural and physical sciences preoccupied with such machines. Machines such as the 
Walking Head raise many questions without providing any satisfactory answers. Machines 
that store and distribute knowledge are the subject of a separate chapter in this exegesis; 
here we must look at our own individual lived experiences, shared cultural heritages and 
grotesque imaginings to answer those questions for ourselves.
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CHAPTER 5: THE SIX LEGGED WALKING MACHINES
In the previous chapter I focused upon situated intelligence in terms of the Walking Head 
project, in this chapter I direct my attention to descriptions of the observable movements 
deployed in Hexapod and Muscle Machine - six-legged robotic walking machines 
developed for Stelarc’s performances. I interrogate whether indeed intelligence may be 
said to be located in movement that is repetitive and unconscious, and whether the human 
body is essentially transformed in its negotiations with prosthetic robotics.
This chapter addresses Hexapod and Muscle Machine, two six-legged, robotic walking 
machines that transfer the movement of human legs to insect-like mechanical ones. They 
were designed and implemented specifically for use in performances by Stelarc. 
Interdisciplinary teams, drawn from the fields of engineering, dance, computer science, 
virtual reality, psychology and art, were responsible for producing the robots. Inman 
Harvey from the cognitive science unit at Sussex University designed Hexapod, and 
Muscle Machine was designed by a committee of the engineering school and 
manufactured at Nottingham-Trent University in England, with financial assistance from 
the Wellcome Trust. The writer and Stelarc had worked in 1998 with an international team 
in the design and construction of Exoskeleton, also a large six-legged walking machine. 
Stelarc has remarked that such collaborations, with so large a group of bright people 
assembled for one purpose, tend to engender humility. (Stelarc, 2002:11) 
Performance
During a performance the six-legged walking machines reconstruct particular forms of 
human, animal and insect embodiment.  When technologies are used to augment, rather 
than replace human functionality questions arise that challenge binary oppositions of 
human and not human formulated in dialectics between metaphysical, humanist, 
existential and phenomenological theorists. 
Walking robots achieve movement through a combination of balance and brute force. The 
six-legged robots employ a strategy common in the natural world amongst millipedes and 
other anthropoids, where limbs are placed in positions roughly equivalent to a tripod. The 
legs form two points on one side and one point on the other side of the creature’s body, 
with the legs in a grounded and stationary position to provide balance, while the other legs 
move forward, uplifted, to re-position themselves as the points of the next tripod. As the 
airborne legs move to their new position, the grounded legs exert horizontal force on the 
body to propel it forward.  The Hexapod and the Muscle Machine were built to extend the 
size, number, appearance and functionality of human legs. Sensors on the robot gather 
information about the human body it encloses, and re-codify the information into 
instructions for the actuators that move the mechanisms’ legs.
Such a device is generically called a compliant servomechanism, the history of which can 
be traced to the automation of weapons platforms on aircraft during WW2. Len Deighton 
(1978) reported that such mechanisms allowed aircrews to attach pencils to the end of 
their guns and write their names with them on cardboard targets during training. Stelarc 
used similar techniques to write evolution on a paper square with three hands during a 
performance with his robotic third arm. Servomechanisms, as the name suggests, 
historically implement servomotor technology, an electromechanical method for the fine 
positioning of a motorized shaft rotating around an arc of 180 degrees. Although other 
technologies, such as hydraulic, pneumatic or shape memory wire, are commonplace, the 
historical name for such devices is still used.
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Hexapod
From its inception as a bio-robot Hexapod was conceptualized around movement found in 
the natural world, which is affected by its physiology. Scientists at the Cognitive and 
Behavioural Sciences Unit (COGS) at Sussex University support the notion that 
evolutionary forces must have played some part in the gait of a species, and duplicating 
these movements mechanically would provide the basis for an energy efficient robot. This 
energy would be derived from compressed air stored onboard the robot and kinetic energy 
derived from movement stored in the robot by a system of springs. Dr Inman Harvey of 
COGS, designed the system that originated from studies he made of the gait of domestic 
dogs. 
In the performance a human operator stands on top of the robot. A pressure sensitive pad 
measures walking movements made by the operator.  Computer software translates those 
human movements into robotic ones to propel the robot forward as described above. 
When the operator wishes to turn the machine he or she simply points their body in the 
desired direction and the robot’s legs adapt accordingly.
The project’s official publication records -
Real world engineering problems of weight and friction were difficult to overcome. Our design and computer 
simulations and animation did not indicate those problems (Stelarc, 2002:2)
Muscle Machine
The Muscle Machine was designed around lessons learnt from the design and 
construction of the Hexapod. Compressed air flowed to thirty rubber muscles that provided 
motive power to the robot body. The Festo Corporation manufactured these robots in the 
United States of America. The muscles expand or contract, according to the pressure of air 
flowing through them, and those motions activate movement in various parts of the robot.
The operator is enclosed by the mechanism. A sensor array attached to the operator’s 
body interprets its position as streams of digital data that activate the robotic systems. The 
operator positions their body in the direction he or she wishes to travel, and begins to 
walk. Human movements are translated into robotic ones, and the six legs move the robot 
in compliance with the motions of the operator. 
The robot was constructed by the Engineering Department at Nottingham Trent University.
Prosthetic devices are regularly used in medicine to replace or augment the functionality of 
human organs and limbs.  Mechanical grippers that replace missing hands and heart 
pacemakers that regulate cardiac functions are familiar examples. Marshall McLuhan 
famously conceptualized electronic media as extensions of human organs, where 
television and radio technologies augment human eyes and ears (McLuhan:1994). 
Computational technologies are regarded by Vannevar Bush (1945) as an augmentation of 
mental aptitudes, just as all manner of mechanical devices visibly extend and augment 
human effort in manual work. 
The six-legged walking machines enact such theorization in synchronizations of motion 
between mind, body and machine made possible by electronic computation and control 
systems.
One reading of these works codes the human body as the controlling brain at the centre of 
the machine, with mechanical limbs entirely at the disposal of the human ones. In motion 
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the robots recode such understandings because the moving human form is visibly part of 
the architecture of the machine, rather than simply a passenger. 
Instead of focusing intelligence in the brain, intelligent behaviour is the result of body architecture. The 
machine itself is not intelligent or autonomous as such - the intelligence is in the architecture that allows the 
machine to respond in effective ways. And that is the problem (Stelarc, 2000:9-10)
Alterations caused by augmentation make problematic formulations of intelligence based 
upon Cartesian mind/body dualism. The codes for mind and body are recoded in the 
movements of the machine as the behavio urs of a purposive system, rather than a 
purposeful mind operating a body. Extending the human form to an insect-like morphology 
confronts humanist theorization of the human body as already perfect. Such 
augmentations suggest possible amplifications of purpose and horizon in human 
experience, challenging conceptualizations of human embodiment as somehow the end of 
evolution. Rather, the human body evolves in and through the workings of the robot, 
suggesting instead a beginning of, or at least a continuation to, evolution of the human 
form and mind.
Evolutionary theory
From its beginnings evolutionary theory has evolved in naturalism to a largely 
unchallenged discourse on all aspects of human experience. Many things, from 
economies to consciousness, are thought capable of evolution; even the human form. The 
latter idea disputes the core of Judeo-Christian theology, where the physical body is 
conceptually rejected as incapable of evolving beyond basic bestial states imposed by 
being part of the natural world. Mind, often conceptualized as immaterial, is the only 
human attribute thought capable of transformation, and only when conceptually 
dissociated from the corporeal body. Moreover, such transformations are conceptualized 
as immaterial, where in a performance the transformation is rendered in movement.
In these works intelligence is not differentiated as a controlling force but instead is codified 
in movement and sequences of movements. Such encoding is usually encountered in 
dance, where the human body in motion becomes a surface upon which to formulate 
concepts, ideas and statements. In the stricter Judeo-Christian and Islamic discourses 
dance is considered immodest and equated with thoughtlessness. Unmediated, dance 
narrows the space between human and not human by drawing attention to animal-like 
kinetics in human movement. In classical ballet embodied motion is legitimized in an 
intellectual meta-discourse as a set of codes whose meanings are rigorously adhered to. 
In the film Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino 1994) seduction and betrayal are enacted in a 
rendering of dance moves popularized during the twentieth century as The Twist, that is 
recognizable only because it adheres to a culturally formulated and enforced set of 
signifiers. 
Signs of language, whether in written, verbal or embodied movement, are understood to 
signify purpose, whether they are immediately comprehensible or not. Mayan glyphs found 
at Tikal in Central America, for example, were conceptualized as writings long before their 
meanings were decoded. One decoding of synchronizations of purpose and movement 
between humans as well as humans and machines, suggests the hive mind, where 
individuality, prized in humanist thought, is subsumed in a collective consciousness 
motivating all embodied life to the same purpose. Encoding of such purpose is often 
imagined as unfathomable and deadly. In John Wyndham’s novel The Midwich Cuckoo 
children born after a meteor falls from the sky act in concert with an alien purpose to terrify 
a small village. In the television series Star Trek Next Generation the Borg assimilated 
humans into their culture by connecting them, through computational informatics, to the 
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shared experience of the Borg’s hive mind. Such connections are thought as alien and 
inimical to individuals, with the humans connected in such ways coded as automata under 
remote control.
Body languages, alongside other communications, are culturally produced and interpreted 
and often represent signifiers of place in a culturally produced symbolic order of things. 
The exaggerated sensuality of the Twist in Pulp Fiction, for example, signifies otherness in 
and rebellion against such ordering - she is married. A dance called the Military Two-Step, 
popular at the start of the Twentieth Century, suggests the opposite. Contrasted, they 
indicate a symbolic order of things based upon division by binary opposition.  The problem 
with such divisions when they are applied to ideas about intelligence, as Stelarc suggested 
in the quotation above, are that those ideas codify not so much what intelligence is, but 
how intelligence is comprehended. Intelligence is often coded as a set of intelligent and 
not intelligent behaviours closely aligned with descriptions of the human and not human. 
Theories of intelligence by behaviourists are discussed elsewhere, but it is significant here 
that intelligence is conceptualized in culture as a set of binary oppositions derived from 
observed behaviours. Those oppositions are displaced and unpacked, during a 
performance by the six-legged walking machines, with the movements of body and 
machine suggestive of some evolving purpose.
Evolution is a discourse that permeates Western culture. Ideas about evolution have had a 
singular affect upon science, where it is disputed as materialistic and one, which privileges 
human competition. Such criticisms may be traced historically to a defence of 
metaphysical creation stories, and to reactions against the ideas of Herbert Spencer (1820 
- 1903), who popularized conceptualizations of the natural world as exemplifying a moral 
order, and linked Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection to justifications of economic 
and social elitism. 
Classical human morphology exemplified in Michaelangelo’s David (Florence) and Adam 
(Sistine Chapel) allow for no possibility of evolution of that form beyond those offered by 
metaphysics. Metaphysical evolution involves a notional transmigration of a perceived 
immaterial part of human beings to an immaterial higher place, encoded as heaven, or 
alternatively it’s de-evolution to a lower place, encoded as hell. Representations of a 
symbolic order in a series of planes placed vertically with the most desirable at the 
pinnacle are exemplified in Dante’s Divine Comedy. The incorporeal human spirit itself 
remains unchanged, but the place where it resides reflects on the moral development, 
rather than the physical evolution of an individual in an eternally unchanging symbolic 
order that provides a metric of moral and not moral behaviours. In these portrayals the 
human condition intelligence is exemplified as motivating moral behaviours that promote 
advancement to a higher plane. Unintelligent behaviours are characterized as 
devolutionary, leading to a lower place in the symbolic order.
In The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace, Margaret Wertheim wrote,
In the scientific world picture, however, physical space came to occupy the whole of reality, leaving no room 
for any other space to be. This vision, originally formulated in the seventeenth century, envisioned the world 
not as a great spiritual hierarchy but as a vast machine. (1999:36)
Telepresence, tele-operation and compliant servo-mechanical systems such as the six-
legged walking machines hasten the conceptual collapse of space between human and 
not human.
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Wertheim notes that the dualism of mind and body survived the mechanization of culture 
and philosophy because Rene Descartes defined the purpose of science as investigating 
the physical world, the res extensa. The world of thought, feeling, and spiritual experience, 
the res cognita, was not encompassed by Cartesian science because the purpose of 
science "…was to describe only the actions of bodies in physical space" (Wetheim, 
1999:36)
A humanist aesthetic that sought to place human embodiment at the centre of things, and 
the human mind at the centre of embodied experience, preceded Cartesian science. This 
approach used action to depict psychological states, where the intentions and purpose of 
mind are rendered visible in and through action, reinforcing ancient ideas about the mind 
as an innovator, initiator and mediator of movement.
As industrialization proceeded in Europe a middle class arose from the ranks of 
merchants, agriculturalists and industrialists made rich through their own efforts rather 
than by inheritance. Such mobility of class became regarded as evidence of progress in 
politics, as well as science and technology, caused by the application of reason, science 
and individual effort. Together with Social Darwinism (Social Spencerism) there was a 
sense that civilization itself was evolving through and by the actions of elite individuals. 
Intelligence became conceptualized as an evolutionary force expressed in politics. Martin 
Heidegger, in Being And Time (1923), focused the attention of philosophy upon agency, 
the intent of those actions and what he later described in Introduction to Metaphysics 
(1953) as the confrontation of planetary technology and modern humanity in Europe 
during the 1920s and 1930s wrought by realizing the power of ideas in action.  Purpose 
and intent and the intelligence those attributes imply, became expressed in and by 
movement.
The six-legged walking machines offer evidence of evolution mediated in and 
simultaneously accelerated by technology. The extra legs amplify the human body to giant 
proportions, yet the Hexapod in particular was capable of subtle, elegant steps that belied 
its size. The Walking Head robot suggests that human evolution may be achieved through 
movement into a state where the human and the not human are no longer 
comprehensible.
Simultaneously the performance conceptualizes the human body as an agent, rather than 
end, of evolution and change. Technology allows the rapid prototyping of new embodied 
experience, whether in the immersive technologies of virtual reality or the application of 
compliant servomechanisms that amplifies and expands human form and purpose. 
Conceptualizations of technology as an evolutionary force echo those of eighteenth 
century humanist philosopher Julian Offray de La Mettrie, who maintained that moral 
evolution could be achieved through technological change. He proposed constructing a 
society of human-like robots that would live together in perfect harmony, free from human 
competitive nature while enjoying all the benefits of civilization.  De La Mettrie thought that 
robots would be animated by a life essence that existed in all living things and which could 
somehow be infused into mechanical parts. He hypothesized that such a society would be 
free of animal instincts as well as disease, decay and death that accompany existence and 
would therefore be more amenable to moral progress than cultures of his time (De La 
Mettrie, 1912).
During the Enlightenment and afterward the idea that moral evolution could be brought 
about through applications of the scientific method led to serious attempts to realize such 
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evolutions in human affairs. Esperanto, for example, the constructed language invented by 
the Polish Opthomologist Dr. Lazarus Ludovic Zamenhof first appeared in 1887. It was 
theoretically a universal means of communication, potentially capable of mitigating the 
mutual hatred he observed between Russian, Polish, German and Jewish sections of his 
own neighborhood, and afterward the whole world, through shared understandings 
encoded in the iterative mechanisms of a common language. 
Some of the negative affects of technological change on economies, societies and cultures 
perceived by theoreticians and cultural critics are discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. 
Constructed languages and computational linguistics are also dealt with in a separate 
section.
When the robots are still the performance provokes humanist ideas of the human body at 
the center of things, as well as the idea that the artifact is completely at the disposal of its 
operator. Intelligence is seen as contained within the mechanism, like a brain in a body. As 
it moves from a stationary position, differences between machine and operator are 
subsumed in movement, and the performance invites re-codification of human experience 
as mobile, fluid, uncertain and in constant change. Tele-operation, telepresence and 
compliant servomechanisms challenge humanist ideas about the integrity of the human 
body by collapsing the space between the human and not human. 
Action is coded in the robots as a set of intentions amplified by artificial muscles and 
mechanical limbs. While the robots are at rest the human body is visible as the controlling 
entity-a captain of a ship. When the robots are moving the human body appears part of the 
mechanism of motion, no longer a guiding force. In Stelarc’s Locomotor performance the 
human form rotates around a vertical axis while the robot legs trace a horizontal one. Any 
intent, purpose or intelligence formerly contained by the human form is extended in and 
transformed by the mechanism in motion. The space between living and not living things 
collapses in movement during such performances, echoing the collapse of space between 
human and animal in dance.
Stelarc said "I think we now have the technology and the imaging systems that allow us to 
really probe the body as both an anatomical and an evolutionary structure" (Live Art 
Letters 1)
A new dialectic emerges during such performances, which are difficult to codify. However, 
Orlan’s body modifications trace a similar trajectory akin to the Baroque tradition rather 
than the neo classic intellectualism of the Renaissance or Enlightenment in that dialogue 
emerges through movement. This new dialectic then may be characterized as an 
embodiment proffered as fluid, distributed in and by technologies. The binary oppositions 
of humanism that sanctify human embodiment through integrity of form, intention and 
containment are contrasted with the dehumanizing, not human other.
The six legged walking machines are probes into the human condition in the tradition of 
Marshall McLuhan’s technology based inquiries. They are constructed to frame questions 
rather than provide answers. They challenge conventional ideas about anatomy and 
evolution by re-codifying those attributes as the results of intelligent human intent. They 
confront ideas about human physiology by extending and augmenting that physiology. 
They engage with ideas about mind by magnifying purpose and intent to a sphere far 
greater than that encompassed in humanist thought. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE youRobot
In this installation I present a mechanical intelligence to explore the human condition. We 
use the rhetorics and discourses surrounding such devices in a narrative that reframes 
and restates old humanist debates about what it means to be human. These questions 
have become particularly poignant in the face of technological change. We use the 
techniques, materials and logic from areas of inquiry in mechanical intelligence to 
articulate those questions.
The youRobot
The youRobot is a work that brings together several preoccupations of the research in one 
piece. The economic imperatives for making robots are evident in the depiction of a call 
centre operator. The robot produces language and refers to the production of knowledge 
by informatics systems. Like all informatics systems it leaks unauthorized data, as poetry, 
into the wider world. It is surveilled by an unseen overseer. When it senses it is being 
watched the machine performs its tasks faster. It addresses displacement and alienation in 
the workplace, fears about privacy, censorship and knowledge monopolies, and 
oppressive workplace regulation. It is the robot we all feel we are sometimes, in workplace 
environments where process and rhetoric over come humanity and reason. 
The research canvasses the social, political, and cultural reasons for such preoccupations 
with robotic technology and simultaneously the requirements for making such devices. The 
robot is equipped with a small language synthesizer developed during experimentation 
with the artificial language Solresol. The sensor array is adapted from some 
experimentation at RMIT and MIT universities in miniature mobile robotics. The system 
produces a simple set of behaviours, through the operations of servo-motors and central 
processing units that constitute the finished installation.
The title of the work, the youRobot, and its construction as a workstation, suggest an 
affinity between people and machines, rather than the dysfunctional dichotomy between 
them suggested by Chaplain in the film Modern Times, or Jaques Tati in the film M. Hulot`s 
Holiday. The intent is to explore through satire some of the fears of informatics systems 
expressed by Marjorie Kibby and some of the claims about them exemplified in Caesar. If 
Anthropologist Kibby’s polemic rests at one end of a rhetorical arc, then that of Caesar, the 
Creationist, lay at the extreme other. He maintains that anything which is made is a sign of 
intelligent design, a position hotly disputed by Elaine Scarry in her essays about torture 
and war in the Body in Pain, the Making and Unmaking of the World. 
The research that produced the youRobot is less about machines and more about us. In 
this research I follow theorization of embodiment as a mechanical experience, following 
ideas proposed in various disciplines in the field of machine intelligence that have gained 
currency in the wider community. Ideas about our own agency and free will are 
conjectured to be, more or less, behaviours resulting from biomechanical programming 
overlaid with epic, mythic, and sometimes hallucinatory, narrative.   
It is appropriate to enact ideas that challenge the ways we think about ourselves through 
machines as well as through more conventional narrative forms like painting, poetry, plays 
or films because the genre allows the work to be presented as an archetype, dealing first 
with sociopolitical commentary, and referring to the origins of robots in modern literature 
without much further explanation. We are familiar with robots presented, in popular culture, 
as mechanisms that substitute human bodies and activities in the workplace for metal or 
informatics ones. Vending machines have replaced the canteen and email has replaced 
the mailroom.
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There is as well a physical presence suggested by robotic machines that amplifies the 
absence of a lived body. This interplay of embodied presence and absence is conspicuous 
in the works.  Julie Clarke wrote of this work "it mocks our own unseen and unnoticed 
internal bodily functions as pure automata." (2002a).
Simultaneously, and despite the epic hopes and dreams enacted in society and culture 
through monumental achievements in art, engineering, and science, the body is 
sometimes exposed in the works as a complex but deterministic mechanical system that is 
nevertheless vulnerable and often frail in ways that machines are not.
The machine lacks the capacity to evoke an emotional response with the same intensity as 
painting, poetry, plays and films, but that is a great strength these mechanical systems 
bring to a debate about what it is to be human. We leave emotions aside in this work, as 
far as possible, so we can more readily speak to the mechanical determinism that we 
conjecture characterizes the human condition.
That is not to say that the themes tackled here are lesser ones than those expressed in 
other genres, or that the themes deserve a lesser stage. In one of the animated precursors 
to this work human bodies were encased from waist to shoulders in a mechanical system 
called the Movatar-Avatar (Middleton/Stelarc:1998-9) that allowed a computer program to 
control the body’s movements. Five, six or seven bodies were to perform a grand high-
tech opera with human bodies animated and voiced by machines. The opera was to 
express the human condition as a set of deterministic motions sometimes, and with great 
difficulty, temporarily overcome by individual human will but more often expressed through 
compliance with the machine. (Ironically, the opera succumbed to a particularly human 
frailty when its producer fled with its funds).
The youRobot is constructed from metal laminate, wood, plastic, and electronic circuitry 
developed during the research. The installation has two microprocessors for computation 
and control, operated by custom software written in the Java and C languages. 
Communication in the system is handled internally by the RS232 serial protocol and 
externally by the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol. The system is distributed amongst the 
processors, sensors, servomotors by a software process manager that handles 
multithreaded task protocols. The control electronics, sensor array and distributed software 
agents that provide the mechanical intelligence were developed and realized by the artist. 
The laminate body is constructed and installed by professional fabricators. The robot 
sends and receives email, and keeps a blog.
Workplace slaves
The themes exposed in this present work are displacement and alienation.  Anthropologist 
Marjorie Kibby describes informatics systems as a mighty force for social change because 
the informatics age introduced women into previously male-dominated workforces. She 
gives the example of News Limited’s digitalization that led to the notorious riots in 
Wapping, London, when, as Kibby describes it, centuries of tradition and patriarchal power 
derived from male “ownership” of the hot-metal linotyping process in the printing and 
kindred industries was shattered by the introduction of the computer workstation operated 
by young intelligent women. Dehumanized by the machines, the workers were eventually 
led to despair and riot, not so much by changing work practices, but more importantly by 
the social upheaval caused by the male workers loss of social status. (Kibby,1996).
The phenomenon of the lived body is ultimately a private one, but here one is invited to 
share an experience of it that is only felt through the exposition of bodies and behaviours 
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as mechanisms and the destruction of old ways in the name of progress. Humans tend to 
reject such experiences, expelling them to a realm of nightmares and equating industrial 
machines, especially robots, with soulless monsters. Kibby theorizes that fears of 
workplace change wrought by information and robotic technologies are exposed in cultural 
objects like the Terminator franchise, where most humans and their societies have been 
destroyed by robots and the remainder are about to be killed by them.
Coined in the Czech language, the word ‘robot’ was synonymous with ‘slave’. From its 
inception, a mechanistic experience of a body was conceived as an abject, nightmarish, 
one. Describing these preoccupations with the soulless and abject, Stelarc wrote that "we 
fear what we always have been" (2002b).
Karel Capek’s RUR proposes, in the first literary description of modern robots, a 
mechanical workforce engaged in jobs disliked, unwanted by, or too dangerous to humans. 
These have been the tasks of slaves since the dawn of Western Civilization (Plato 
Republic). In Act III of RUR the robots rise against the oppressive humans, killing them all 
but learning a moral lesson along the way that may make the two surviving robots a new 
Adam and Eve. This rewriting of the creation myth along Sparticist lines expresses the 
political turmoil and social upheaval in early twentieth century Central Europe, through its 
substitution of mechanical for human protagonists, in a fashion acceptable to audiences 
and censors of the time.
The youRobot was inspired, in part, by a line from Capek 
I want to turn the worker into a machine. I want to get rid of his camaraderie and his feelings of compassion 
because I don't need those things in my factory.  (Capek 1921)
The youRobot is programmed to produce random lines of poetry and insert those amongst 
the businesslike emails and blog entries it creates. This is a minor embellishment of mine 
on the genre meant simply to create another set of opposites by connecting to, as Clarke 
put it, "the possibility of life" amongst the machines that excites interest in popular culture. 
(Or perhaps, at some level, I do not entirely reject psychoanalytical descriptions of human 
behaviour in my own work, as Stelarc has in his).
One of the more incomprehensible rhetorical strands regarding artificial life the research 
uncovered was a position that 
Evolution or no, the creation of a-life by an outside intelligence adds further strength to the 
conclusion that the amazing intricacy of nature required an outside, intelligent Designer (his 
emphasis).16 
Caesar refers to rules-based flocking behaviour algorithms produced by the study of birds 
by Shawn Carlson in the field of ethnology for the core of his argument. Carlson observes 
that a few simple rules produce observably complex behaviour (2000). Such complexity, 
Caesar argues, can only be produced by rules imposed upon a system from its outside, 
the so-called intelligent design creation narrative. Such arguments seem to spring from 
utopian visions like De Mettre had, where perfect rules produced perfect societies that I 
have described elsewhere in this essay. 
What is interesting here is the inclusion of scientific data in a polemic supporting an attack 
on science that illustrates the preoccupation of the research with rhetoric and discourse. In 
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16 INVESTIGATING GENESIS Stephen Caesar website http://www.rae.org/artificiallife.html last viewed 
Friday, 8 September 2006 
The Archaeology of Knowledge Michel Foucault (1972) has described at length a process 
where authorities of specification from the sciences are incorporated into a discourse 
regardless of whether the science addresses that discourse of itself. Foucault concludes 
that such appeals to authorities, like Caesar’s to Carlson, are sometimes endorsed by 
those authorities, and incorporated into mainstream knowledge, as scientists form 
alliances with Government and culture to sustain their funding, misgivings about the 
veracity of the work notwithstanding (Brooks also mentions this in his attack on robotics). 
The concatenation of artificial and biological life is a case on point.
Frankenstein’s monster, according to Mary Shelly conceived of in a dream, is the creature 
most referred to in critical analysis of artificial life in literature. Mechanical behaviours 
seem to connect to some visceral, dissociative, part of our natures that, according to 
Freud, we experience in dreams. These unconscious parts of ourselves tend to 
uncomfortably remind us of our capacity for deep passions even as we seek, in this body 
of work, to illustrate and experience existence as a continuum of discrete mechanistic 
parts.
Scarry’s view is that mechanical systems, whether produced by Judeo-Christian histories 
or by Marxist theorization, and especially those produced in the military/industrial complex, 
are often evidence of stupidity, rather than intelligence. The mindless operations of the 
robot suggest both the frailty of humans caught in the sometimes brutal and brutalizing 
machinations of economic and political power and the mechanisms of brutalization and 
despotism. Scarry would seem to support all but the most extreme of Kibby’s arguments, 
where the cyborg, represented in computer workstations as a dark emasculating force 
feared and loathed by a predominantly male workforce, introduces females into a 
dominant position in the workplace. There is little evidence that workplaces are any less 
patriarchal for the introduction of computer workstations. In a large gallery space the 
youRobot, in fact, seems cowed by its circumstances, as any slave would understandably 
be in a system where camaraderie and feelings of compassion are forbidden.
Scarry takes the view that made objects reciprocate their maker’s desires. While that 
process can be elaborate, it only signifies a sentient desire to make, and any sentience 
ascribed to an artifact is a projection of our own longing reciprocated in the artifact.
The call centre and its army of operators are emblematic of both the globalization of the 
world’s economies and the technologies deployed in them. It is suggestive of 
dehumanizing processes associated with mechanical technologies that subsume the work 
formerly performed by humans. It is reasonable to suggest that the robot reciprocates what 
is feared in technological globalization, as well as what is desired.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is considered the founder of modern metaphysical 
materialism. His contribution was to equate the quantitative models of matter with the 
whole of reality, ignoring the reductive process involved in their origin, and so creating a 
metaphysics of mechanism (Flew:1985). However, to identify models (for example models 
of Newtonian particles) with natural bodies, or to regard them as equivalent, is to commit a 
category mistake of a type identified by Wittgenstein and mentioned elsewhere in this 
essay. Although they can appear in sentences of the same logical form, natural bodies and 
mathematical models do not enjoy the same form of existence. They are conflated through 
rhetoric rather than reality.
Language is perhaps the one technology which makes anything appear possible. 
Language is abstracted from experience while seeming to refer to it directly. For example 
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we can use language to construct existences where we live on for ever, like the Judeo-
Christian conceptualizations of heaven and hell, the Hindu traditions of reincarnation, and 
the comfortable futures of television advertisements. Who amongst us is brave enough to 
completely dismiss such constructs as completely imaginary? Our lived experience of 
technology, by contrast, is one of displacement, change and loss in the workplace and 
dependencies on commodities whose price fluctuations, like those of petrol, housing, and 
medicine, cause hardship and anxiety in the wider society.
The youRobot is situated in the gap between what is spoken and what is done. It 
challenges descriptions of interactive multimedia art because it cannot be touched. There 
is no gadget to manipulate, no choices presented to the viewer. Rather, we are reminded 
of the mechanical determinism everyone experiences from time to time in the workplace, 
determinism reminiscent of the existence of slaves in ancient times. We are reminded and 
at once helpless to do anything about it. 
The equivalence of workers and machines suggested in modern economics is a category 
mistake, brought about by the wishful thinking amongst managers that is illustrated in the 
quote from Capek cited above, that, in part, inspired this work. Mechanisms become 
metaphysical when the assumption is made that all phenomena, including natural bodies, 
are adequately explained by intrinsically immutable (subject to no intrinsic change) 
quantity and local motion, the basic characteristics of inert matter and machines. This is 
the mistake Mary Shelley, writing before Wittgenstein, identified in her Frankenstein 
creation myth. She asserts that the made and the born are not equivalent: they only seem 
that way when the phenomenon of the lived body is characterized incorrectly. Shelley 
implies that such characterizations are not caused by the scientific method itself, but by 
abuses of science arising from individual ambition and greed. Hers is a proposition based 
upon reason, rather than fear.
A new monster?
Like Frankenstein’s monster, the youRobot presents as a nightmarish vision of humanity 
perverted and enchained by science. The nightmare is distinctly Baudrillardian because 
the robot spews forth information, rather than the infernal mechanical sparks and steam 
that Shelley may have been familiar with from technologies in her time. The code and text 
produced by the machine is residue of embodied experience spewed out after that 
experience has been devoured (Clarke:2002). Its mirrored surface and screen, amplifies 
and retransmits flattened images of the world encoded as multiple distorted reflections. 
The occasional glimpse of a poetic in those codes serves to heighten the feeling that 
somewhere amongst the machine is a broken heart.
Camaraderie and compassion are two of the codes that society depends upon, according 
to Elaine Scarry, to produce civilizing artifacts like clothing, houses, hospitals, schools and 
ideas about corporate responsibility. Those are the objects that depend upon human 
emotion, and which are least likely to reflect Hobbes’ metaphysics of materialism in their 
imagining, construction and operation. The place of robots in popular culture is that of an 
aggressor against human qualities like compassion and camaraderie. Just when we are 
getting to know Frankenstein’s creation, in Shelley’s story, it murders a child. At the 
moment information and robotic technologies appear in the workplace they alter the future 
of its workforce, so destroying all the dreams of the future that workforce formerly 
subscribed to.
Paul Virilio (1989) has observed that there is no point having a satellite-based electronic 
global positioning system when, as he puts it, the Americans in charge of the satellites can 
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alter the coordinates of any object they wish to without notice. Any object with common 
sense, for instance a human being, will ignore the data from the global positioning system 
in favour of their own senses. Any machine will not, because it cannot perceive the 
difference between what is spoken and what is done. Such perceptions take place in the 
human frontal lobe of the brain, which remains a 'black box' to empirical science. Like 
Rene Descartes observed (je ponse, je suis), we can only conclude we exist after we have 
thoroughly doubted existence.
The poetic that sometimes emerges from the robot’s routine communications raises the 
possibility of an experience of the lived body. Emerging from inside the machine, that 
possibility is immediately lost amongst the other endless communications from the 
cybernetic host. The youRobot suggests the possibility of life in the machine, only to 
immediately dismiss it. The machine is a parody that exposes the agony of modern 
workplaces as agonies of death, not rebirth. 
Many of the arguments in favour of conflating mechanical with lived intelligence are 
exposed, in the youRobot, as originating in economic endeavours. Those arguments are 
given weight, as Rodney Brooks explains in his paper Intelligence Without Reason 
discussed elsewhere in this essay, by authorities of specification who have an economic 
interest by way of endowments and grants to their institutions, rather than a purely 
academic one. In Literature, empirical science and in popular culture robotics and machine 
intelligence has its foundations in ambition and anxiety.
It is self-evident that some important embodied experiences, like those of cardio-
respiratory system, are automatic. Further, some human responses seem so widely 
distributed amongst human beings, for example the capacity to love and be loved, that 
they appear automatic, or cliched. Those attributes that appear mechanical tend to support 
behavioural models of existence adopted in rhetorics as proof that machines can exist as 
we do. However, there is no continuum amongst machines that is comparable to the 
continuum of human existence. If I transfer one of my vinyl records to a compact disc, a 
process commonly called ripping, I must first decide how many digital samples per second 
to rip the audio in my record collection from its analogue state to a digital state that can be 
stored on a digital compact disc or an i-pod. There is no continuum possible in digital 
devices. The natural world is represented as samples, rather than as a continuous signal. 
Digital music sounds continuous, but it is not. Digital machines are machines in ways that 
humans are not.
A simple thought experiment, after the analogies favored by Bernard Williams (2004), 
takes the point further. I make a machine intelligence programmed to gather data from, 
and draw conclusions about, the natural world. The mechanism is solar-powered, and 
shuts down at night when the sun goes down. I place the machine in a remote location 
and wait. How will the machine interpret what it sees?
When I go back to the machine after a few years I see I have made an awful mistake. The 
mechanism has concluded that there must be something interfering with the normal course 
of events in nature because objects moved in the sky without warning, surfaces became 
wet without explanation and leaves on trees withered in an instant. The machine has 
become paranoid, insisting that some force is moving things around before its very 
senses. I unplug the mechanism to permanently end its misery. Anything that had 
happened during the night was unprocessed by its sensors, and it had made up stories to 
account for what it saw because it was not aware that it slept.
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Stripping the emotional content from an artwork only serves to accentuate its absence. 
Including a poetic in this genre heightens the absence of lived experience. If there is not 
evidence of life in the machine then we are forced to look at ourselves for it. Proposing a 
natural world where all things are equally mechanical would seem preposterous when 
simultaneously dealing with issues of human alienation, fear, change and despair.
The image of the knowledge worker is a very modern one. Instant messaging, blogging 
and emails are all part of a daily life unimaginable when Capel wrote RUR. The production 
and distribution of messages from machines is a development thought by many academics 
from Frederick Jamieson (1991) forward, to signify a new media. Ideas about the hypertext 
and so-called new media are explored elsewhere in this project but it is clear from the 
presentation of machine-generated text that the work makes a commentary on the 
monotony of machine-generated texts. Even those texts that signify a poetic are rendered 
banal by sheer volume. The tedium of the messages produced by the youRobot at the rate 
of about five or six a minute, faster if it is being watched, suggests the production line and 
sweatshop. The messages are themselves composed of very few words endlessly 
recycled in different grammatical forms. If a human spoke thus it would suggest dementia. 
In a machine it is judged intelligence. 
The youRobot is a work that at once brings together several preoccupations of the 
research and raises issues that propel the remainder of the work forward. It is evident in 
this work that representations of humans and the human condition as machines, no matter 
how unemotional those renderings attempt to be, raise questions about the human 
experience that are rendered more intense through their absence in the work. Responding 
to surveillance by humans, the robot works faster. This inverted experience of affecting a 
machine through watching it accentuates human anxieties over mechanical surveillance in 
modern times. The robot is engaged in work normally undertaken by humans in call 
centres. The messages produced by the machine are appear at once authoritative and 
bewildering as those sometimes encountered in reality from call centres. 
This work provided a focus for the works that followed it that was previously 
underestimated. Rather than a performance by a body attached to and become part of a 
mechanical system, it is an installation, a work field of practice that demands the 
presentation of opposites. But rather than present those opposites the installation 
excludes all signs of opposition save those engendered by the experience of it discussed 
here. The work therefore brings something new, in the form of technologies, and 
something old, in the form of practice, to a gallery. 
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CHAPTER 7: METHODS
Two works in the series open this discussion to the histories of practice I engaged with 
during the project. Those are the Vocalizing Avatar and the Visual Field Automata 
installations.
The processes by which I arrived at concepts for those works expose the investigative 
methods used.
Visual Field Automata
Visual Field Automata implements computer software protocols common in computational 
vision systems. It computes human movement as a series of differences in a visual field. 
Those differences are rendered as colored squares, which are displayed on video 
projectors or a series of plasma screens.
The technology was synthesized from two distinct sets of information technologies: 
computational logic producing cellular automata17, and computational vision derived from 
developments in surveillance technologies. 
Surveillance technologies are often systems of many different devices networked together 
for one end. In my mind those devices are linked conceptually by their use of mathematical 
theories to produce behaviour. 
Cellular automata are derived from a mathematical algorithm that produces a simulation of 
evolutionary theories developed by Charles Darwin that proposed natural selection plays a 
major part in sexual reproduction and survival of species.  Some of the stronger rhetoric in 
discussions of artificial intelligence suggests that the simulation is itself some kind of 
universal mathematical proof that natural selection dominates life in every aspect.
Cellular automata are easily produced using paper squares and a pencil, but are 
commonly computed by software, following simple rules based arithmetic protocols, and 
displayed on computer terminals. I refer to speculations about cellular automata as 
artificial life in a previous chapter. 
Visual Field Automata is an artwork that refers to the use of cellular automata in art, for 
example by the English/Australian artist Paul Brown, but does not implement similar 
protocols. The automata are instead created by the motion of bodies in the visual field.
Visual Field Automata was so named in homage to Visual Field Automatic, an early 
artwork by Stephen Willat in 1964 that uses computational logic to randomly illuminate a 
series of coloured lenses that a viewer theoretically attempts to “fashion into a regular 
rhythmic configuration’ (Stephens & Stout, 2004:40).  The idea follows theories of the 
cybernetics of communication proposed by Wiener, Mead and others using diagrams of 
connections to describe human communication in large organizations such as armies and 
distributed manufacturing industries (Stephens & Scott, 2004:40).
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17 Cellular automata provides a method for modelling populations over time. It is used in theoretical 
information science, mathematics, and theoretical biology.  The model provides a regular grid of cells, each 
in one of a finite number of discrete states. The grid can be in any finite number of dimensions. Time is also 
discrete, and the state of a cell at time t is a function of the states of a finite number of cells (called its 
neighbourhood) at time t-1. These neighbours are a selection of cells relative to the specified cell, and do not 
change. Every cell follows the same evolutionary rule for updating, based on the values in its neighbourhood. 
Each time the rules are applied to the whole grid a new generation is created. 
In Visual Field Automata a camera was placed in a space frequented by pedestrian traffic. 
Visual information is taken from the camera by a data cable to a processor, which 
computationally manipulates the data and sends it to a large video projection. The data 
manipulation protocol is structured only to represent movement. An observer who has 
stopped to look at the projected information remains absent from the visual field but can 
observe the encoded movement of others within it.
The resulting projection is an infinite regular grid of coloured cells that seem, at a glance, 
to change position randomly. 
Because the small coloured cells endlessly re-form and repeat across the visual field the 
artwork suggests engagement with Kinetic Art from the 1960s and 1970s, particularly 
paintings and prints by Bridget Riley and Victor Vasarely, who demonstrated movement 
through clever signaling of coloured geometric shapes across the visual field with 3D 
optical effects or by subtle changes made to the surface of the object. Kinetic artists were 
also concerned with creating sculptures, paintings, mobiles and automatons that reflected 
the movement of humans or objects in space. 
The origins of cellular automata stem from ideas about living machines. In a series of 
lectures in the late 1940s and early 1950s MIT professor Jon Von Neumann imagined an 
infinite lake in which a robot and all the parts required to construct similar robots floated. 
Von Nuemann described such machines as self-replicating, and went on to describe a 
mathematical system that allowed these floating robots to produce mutated copies of 
themselves and evolve into mechanisms unimagined by their original designers.  
Cambridge Mathematician, John Conway, later conceptualized the mathematics involved 
as cellular automata (Ward, 1999:64-71).
English/Australian technology artist and artificial life enthusiast Paul Brown describes his 
excitement on reading mathematical descriptions of cellular automata and the graphical 
rendering of their behaviour (Conway’s Glider) on early desktop computer displays.18  He 
asks: 
Is it possible instead to create an aesthetic behaviour? An automaton that can itself create unique artworks 
that reflect a "personal" and evolving aesthetic that is distinguishable from its human builder? I think it is and 
that the quest for this goal is one of the most interesting challenges that artists face in these brave new 
cyberworlds. (Brown, 1996:5)   
Discussions of self-replicating machines are distinguished by such rhetorical flourishes. 
In my project I looked for and found imagery similar to examples of cellular automata; 
patterns reminiscent of those generated computationally with fractional geometry (which 
produces images commonly described as fractals), rather than in the dramatic rhetoric of 
artificial life. I located those patterns by observing the stimulation of artificial neurons in 
artificial intelligence software networked with surveillance cameras.
Visual Field Automata implements technologies associated with ubiquitous surveillance 
technologies. Their highly visible presence suggests that the human gaze is being 
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18 Brown makes the distinction between the cellular automata described by John Von Nueman and the 
simplified algorithm implemented in Richard Conway’s Game Of Life, where cells in an infinite square grid 
are switched on and off according to the number of adjacent cells that are on (Brown, 1996:3).
replaced by the mechanical one. However, the deployment of security cameras in our 
streets, plazas and malls resonate with the emotion of fear.
Governments, communities and corporations install video surveillance systems in the hope 
that criminals will fear their identity being captured by surveillance systems. The more 
sophisticated systems use biometrics, motion tracking and image databases. 
Computational behavioural profiling systems linked to security cameras provide real time 
monitoring of security cameras at sporting events, particularly European soccer 
internationals, airports and nightclub districts to identify individuals and groups within a 
crowd that might pose a threat to safety and order and sound an alarm when a profile is 
matched.
The Visual Field Automata is perhaps a somewhat playful response to the anxieties 
surrounding such technologies.
Vocalizing Avatar
The Vocalizing Avatar is a more explicit rendering of epistemological and technical ideas 
about intelligence than the Visual Field Automata. It is a 3D animated speaking model of a 
human head rendered on a computer display. It was built to explore ideas about 
intelligence as information. It refers also to the use of digital representations of people in 
networked computer and virtual reality environments.
An avatar is a graphical personification of a computer process intended to make a network 
or computing environment familiar and friendly for human users. The term has been 
popularized through the use of icons, often called avatars, to represent users in online 
instant message systems.19 
I have traced vocalizing artifacts in culture in a previous chapter.  The Vocalizing Avatar 
refers to the totemic use of mummified heads in ancient Western culture.  It refers to ideas 
of such artifacts possessing supernatural, oracular, or godlike powers. It is in part an 
investigation of so called new-age conceptualizations of reality that include guardian 
angels, spirit guides, channeling, Second Life and the talking paper clip that Microsoft 
Corporation developed to assist people to use Microsoft Office software. 
The Vocalizing Avatar springs from conversational agent technologies that can be traced 
to those developed by Joseph Wiesenbaum in the 1960s which are discussed in another 
chapter. The Vocalizing Avatar differs from those technologies by extending the idea of a 
conversational agent from a machine that converses by answering questions to one that 
interacts by asking questions.
That idea emerged after several iterations of bibliographic research and prototyping during 
the project. The first iteration was an internet based chatterbot (2002) embellished with a 
small set of images suggestive of some presence behind text on the monitor. Iterations 
that followed focused on different ways to achieve the computational production of 
language. 20
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19 In ancient Asian usage an Avatar is the incarnation of a deity in human or animal shape that has 
descended to earth from heaven for some purpose (in literal translation from Sanskrit passing down). 
Avatars feature in many creation and morality tales. There is little evidence to suggest that the Western 
usage has similar epistemology to the Eastern.
20 available online, see page 3
Chatterbot software characteristically manipulates the input typed at a keyboard to form a 
response. The prototypes I developed were concrete implementations of stand alone 
language synthesizers that do not depend upon text input. Instead, they compute 
language from a set of templates derived from the analysis of spoken phrases. I used that 
strategy to develop a prototype internet based avatar that produces surreal poetry.  That 
prototype formed the basis of the youRobot’s capacity to produce words in response to 
stimuli other than language.
I have used a general approach to engineering during the project suggested by Rodney 
Brooks, the Australian director of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. I have been assisted in that approach by networking with 
engineers, technicians and academics of the various faculties involved in parts of the 
project as it unfolded.
In that general approach a robot does not have a central processing unit. Rather, its 
computational facilities are distributed across layers of functionality that collaborate to 
achieve whatever task the robot engages. 
The layers of functionalities such as walking, speech and vision synthesis are 
encapsulated in software compiled in the Java programming language, a multi platform 
computer software protocol. Much of the software development was undertaken in the C 
and C++ languages and the lessons learned used to conceptualize and engineer software 
libraries in the Java language.
The strategy was used to manage effort and consequently increase the detail with which 
each area of interest was examined. For example, some functionality of the stationary 
youRobot was derived from experiments with a small mobile wheeled robot prototype that 
was used as a vehicle for software development during the project. Other functionality was 
transferred from experimentation with language synthesis. The computational vision that 
underlies Visual Field Automata is derived from experiments with a small prototype legged 
robot equipped with an “eye”.
Much effort was directed toward developing software protocols engineered to work 
together with other software protocols. One protocol implements the engineering standard 
Artificial Intelligence Markup Language 1.0 (AIML) approved by the W3C consortium that 
allows it to be programmed using Extensible Markup Language (XML). Another protocol 
implements an interface to Princeton University’s Wordnet database, a huge compilation of 
English language arranged in a semantic web. 
As the work continued prototypes assumed a variety of configurations. Strategies were 
reformulated and culled over much iteration. Strategies that proved most robust were 
incorporated into the architecture of the works discussed in this exegesis. 
The method produced the Vocalizing Avatar, an artificial intelligence that is functional in 
multiple domains. I have used it as a desktop encyclopedia and calendar for two years. It 
has appeared as a talking head on television and given a speech at a conference. The 
Vocalizing Avatar asks questions along with its conversational capabilities.
That functionality required the development of an augmented finite state machine (AFSM), 
a logical mechanism that evaluates progress toward some goal. Experiments with the 
mobile robots gave me the familiarity with goal directed behaviours. That allowed me to 
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write Java implementations of an AFSM algorithm that enabled the Vocalizing Avatar to 
evaluate answers to its questions.
During the project the Vocalizing Avatar evolved from a simple web based conversational 
agent to a complex artificial intelligence. Its engineering incorporates many lessons 
learned from the deployment of robots in real world situations. Visual Field Automata arose 
from my mind’s journey through the many theoretical conceptualizations of intersections 
between machines and culture the project engaged with. 
Interwoven theory and practice led me to develop works that are as chimeric as the idea of 
intelligence. Engaging in repetition helped me refine the works to the extent that the 
Vocalizing Avatar can plug in to a diverse range of technologies that allow it to walk, sing, 
remember, speak, as well as see, when the technology behind Visual Field Automata is 
plugged into it.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
The project work exposes ways that knowledge gained in scientific, engineering and 
cultural studies about intelligent machines may contribute to the design and deployment of 
interactive media, such as the Vocalizing Avatar, in public spaces.  In turn, much of the 
work was published as it developed, linking into and tested against current scientific, 
engineering and cultural knowledge. 
We make mechanical intelligence because we have something to prove regarding our own 
intelligence. The devices expose attributes considered in our culture to be intelligent. The 
size and technical sophistication of the walking machines in particular result from the 
expenditure of considerable funds across several disciplines. Such machines signify 
wealth, power and excess, despite any other significance the artists intend. 
The term “intelligence” is used to distinguish between human and not human. However, a 
non-human, the intelligent machine, has become incorporated into the processes by which 
our culture defines intelligence.21 Those processes were explored in phases of the project 
that focused upon various kinds of interactions between people and machines, particularly 
the ways in which those interactions are mediated by knowledge.
Much of the efforts to make intelligent machines focus upon areas thought to demonstrate 
the differences between humans and other living creatures; recognizing self and other, 
categorizing sensory input against memories, organizing to achieve goals, distinguishing 
truth from lies, contributing to civilization. The project work demonstrates that we can build 
machines which have the capacity to do all those things.
I have argued that the absence of a definitive model of human intelligence raises doubts in 
regard to it being reproduced artificially.22  However problematic, there are accepted and 
observable indicators of human intelligence that may be superimposed on a machine such 
as a robot or 3D conversational agent, that is, they move in ways that suggest intent or 
mind, have the appearance of aliveness, can communicate to a human audience, and 
affect an environment. However, there are no accepted indicators to measure the 
intelligence of machines beyond the successful accomplishment of goals their makers 
have set for them. Where human intelligence is measured, for example by schools and 
universities, in a semblance of objectivity, machine intelligence is proclaimed on the basis 
of subjective experience. 
Brook’s notion of situated intelligence is a valid way to describe machine intelligence that 
is based upon whether the robot can learn about and whether it moves successfully 
through and has an affect on its environment. Nevertheless it should be noted that Brook’s 
canny use of the term situated allows him to speak about the machine as intelligent, on the 
basis that the robot can operate effectively in a controlled environment, whereas it may not 
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21 I imagine that a machine might one day to a doctor " Doctor I`m really stressed at work I can`t concentrate 
I feel every thing`s coming apart". Will the Doctor call a repairman or a psychiatrist?
22 Scientific inquiries to quantify adult human intelligence normally involve analyzing some observations of 
individuals solving a number of problems in a set time. Those observations are compared to the results from 
a similar, previously observed population group. The Weschler scale, a commonly utilized measure of human 
intelligence named after psychologist David Wechsler, assigns a value of 100 to the mean result of such 
tests (mean = number of tests/number of correct answers) and adds or subtracts another 15 points for each 
statistical deviation of  scores above or below the mean. There are no "units" to measure intelligence beyond 
those derived through comparison. Tests which produce an "intelligence quotient" rely upon comparisons 
between different stages of childhood development, and are not used on populations of adults.
be equipped to operate in an unknown, complex environment that includes objects, 
dimensions and attributes that cannot be quantified or described for input into a computer 
program. As an automaton, the robot cannot be imaginative and creative of its own 
volition.
I argue that a 3D animated conversational agent may be perceived as displaying signs of 
intelligence since its can engage in simple conversation with another and has the 
appearances of liveliness. Since we determine intelligence to be associated with 
purposeful action, then all we have to go on when assessing the others’ (whether that be a 
person or a machine) intent, is to weigh up the deed. However, this consideration of the 
actions of another is complex and may include assumptions about the others intent and 
the consequences of the deed. In other words we bring our own predilections and 
prejudices to bear when considering the status of others.  For example assessments 
related to the use of shared language or understood behaviour has become common in 
the regulation of transport and travel. Australia, for example, has recently introduced a 
citizenship test based upon those properties. The fact that machines are capable of 
passing such tests exposes both our everyday reliance on such tests and the cultural 
characterizations they suggest.
We anthropomorphize our creations because they are extensions of us and this enables 
us to perceive aspects of ourselves that we might not otherwise see. Creating machine 
intelligence reveals the attributes that we applaud in ourselves, such as, the ability to 
communicate (whether that be face-to-face or over distance), our need for connection with 
others, our affinity with and dependence upon not human others for our well-being and 
more recently for our creativity. It also reveals ontology associated with automatic 
repetitive behaviour and programmed socialization. Sometimes being intelligent is simply a 
matter of following orders. It is fair to say that, despite great effort to quantify it, we simply 
have no idea what human intelligence is until we discover its lack.23
Part of the problematic associated with research in machine intelligence is that the 
language used about machines is often not objective and descriptive. For example, if the 
word target was used to describe a robot’s destination as opposed to goal, then we would 
perceive a robot’s behaviour to be enacting preprogrammed actions predetermined by the 
human programmer. Robots cannot have goals, since they have no psychology; however 
they can have targets, home in on something, move toward it and affect it. Using the word 
goal impels the programmer’s desire onto the robots actions despite a machine’s 
incapacity for desire. 
On this note, the very fact that we want to perceive these human constructions as 
intelligent is indicative of our investment in the word, which has in secular humanism been 
used to separate the human from the less than human. Paradoxically, by constructing 
robots and machines with marks of intelligence, we assert that these creations are like us 
in that we exhibit machine like behaviour, but in making them we reveal that we are 
superior, since we are their creators and controllers. So, rather than these constructs being 
a vehicle for breaking down the boundaries between the human and not human other, they 
tend to accentuate the binary and uphold the humanist tradition. Nevertheless these 
constructs do provoke discussions around what is human? What is life? How is 
intelligence determined?
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23 For example, a civilization at peace is contrasted by Elaine Scarry with one at war. War is stupid, Scarry 
asserts.  A peaceful civilization reflects intelligence. A culture that loses a war must pacify itself by 
repudiating its warring history, as Germany and Japan were made to in the Twentieth Century. Intelligence is 
characterized, in this rhetoric, as the opposite of a well defined set of properties.
The humanist tradition in our culture provides a set of answers to those questions based 
upon a well constructed set of binary oppositions which set humans apart from, and in 
contrast to, all other things. Despite the aspirations of posthumanists like Donna Haraway 
to escape humanist histories, the rhetorics and discourses of mechanical intelligence 
reflect those binaries.
The Vocalizing Avatar and youRobot in particular reflect cultural expectations of such 
devices. The youRobot exemplifies the knowledge worker toiling tirelessly at menial tasks. 
The Vocalizing Avatar is a technological analogue of a manager class with the capacity to 
distribute knowledge on demand. The walking machines signify the wealth and power of a 
culture capable of producing such artifacts. The visual field automata is a reminder of the 
constant machine-mediated surveillance such a culture depends upon. Each machine 
manufactured during the project performs an aspect of that culture.
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